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Abstract 
Plastic pollution has reached a crisis point, with scientists estimating that, by 2050, there 
could be more plastic in the oceans than fish by weight. This presents a major issue in the 
subject of environmental ethics and shows that our relationship with plastic needs serious 
re-evaluation. The exemplar approach to virtue ethics offers a useful new perspective on 
the plastic pollution crisis and, through the identification of environmentally virtuous 
exemplars, gives us guidance on how to solve the problem. Despite its capacity to 
revolutionise our relationship with plastic being limited by the economic system in which we 
currently live, the exemplar approach has the potential to greatly improve the way we treat 
our environment. The first exemplar identified is the Autonomous Administration of North 
and East Syria, which has demonstrated its environmental virtue through its prioritisation of 
the environmental rights of its citizens. This prioritisation directly results from their 
community-based approach, inspired by the philosophies of Murray Bookchin and Abdullah 
Öcalan. From an individual perspective, we can gain guidance on how to improve our 
personal relationships with the environment by following examples set by indigenous 
populations, in particular Native Americans and aboriginal Australians. It is also important 
that businesses have exemplars they can emulate, as companies are largely responsible for 
the plastic pollution crisis. The Body Shop is an appropriate exemplar in this regard, as it has 
consistently shown a disposition towards protecting the environment and is making an 
effort to reduce the amount of plastic pollution. To a lesser extent Waitrose sets a good 
example of how supermarkets can begin to make progress towards environmental virtue. 
Environmental campaign groups also set a good example by holding the government to 
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Introduction 
Environmental virtue ethics is, according to Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘concerned with 
articulating and defending the green belief in virtue ethics terms’, that is, to use the 
approach and language of virtue ethics to articulate and defend the green belief. What she 
calls the ‘green belief’ is defined as the belief that ‘a fairly radical change in the way we 
engage with nature is imperative’ [Hursthouse, 2007, p.155]. Looking at the state of the 
world today and the climate catastrophe with which we are faced, it is clear to see that this 
belief is justified. An article published in the scientific journal Bioscience in January 2020, 
and endorsed by over eleven thousand scientists worldwide, declared unequivocally that 
‘planet Earth is facing a climate emergency’. Despite the fact that successive coalitions of 
world leaders and scientific communities have made increasingly grave declarations since 
the 1979 First World Climate Conference, the problem is still getting worse [Ripple et al., 
pp.8-12]. Greenhouse gas emissions are rising, as are global temperatures, and the amount 
of plastic pollution in the environment is increasing. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) has now warned that an immense increase in the scale of efforts to 
conserve our biosphere, the thing that keeps us all alive, is needed to avoid the untold 
suffering that the climate crisis will cause [IPCC, 2018]. In light of this overwhelming 
scientific consensus, it is undeniable that the green belief is correct, we have to radically 
change the way we engage with nature.  
 Plastic pollution is the accumulation of synthetic plastic products in the environment 
in a way that is harmful to wildlife and their habitats as well as for human populations. It is 
one of the leading contributors to the climate crisis and has been called ‘one of the world’s 
foremost environmental concerns, alongside climate change and ocean acidification’ 
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[Vethaak & Leslie, 2016, p.6826]. This is also a problem that is only going to get worse, with 
estimates that there could be more plastic in the ocean than fish by weight by the year 2050 
[Sutter, 2016]. It is clear from the scale of plastic pollution in the environment that the 
relationship humans currently have with plastic is unhealthy and needs evaluating.  
 The main aim of this research is to determine how we can employ environmental 
virtue ethics to improve our relationship with plastic. Environmental virtue ethics is a branch 
of virtue ethics, an agent-centred ethical theory that evaluates a person’s moral value based 
on the virtuousness of their character. Character is defined, in this context, as a set of well-
entrenched dispositions that necessarily leads to moral action [Hursthouse, 2013]. 
According to one interpretation of virtue ethics, called the exemplar approach, the best way 
in which we can develop a virtuous character is to identify a moral exemplar, that is, 
someone who has a virtuous character, and emulate how we imagine this person would act 
in our own situations. Through continually emulating the exemplar, the right actions 
become habitual, and we develop a disposition to act virtuously. However, in order for us to 
be able to carry out this process, we need to identify exemplars. This seems to be a problem 
in environmental virtue ethics, as Hursthouse points out: ‘we have so few exemplars of the 
relevant virtues, real or fictional, if any’ and even if we were able to identify them, there 
would be problems with applying their ways of life across contexts to help us deal with our 
problems [Hursthouse, 2007, p.168]. In order to achieve the main aim of this research, I will 
be evaluating possible candidates for environmentally virtuous individuals, communities and 
organisations in order to determine whether or not they are appropriate exemplars for 
environmental virtue ethics. Their appropriateness as environmental exemplars will be 
measured by whether or not they are sufficiently environmentally virtuous, and additionally 
the extent to which we can emulate them in the context of our own lives. The candidates 
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that this research will examine come from a wide range of backgrounds and circumstances, 
and the relevance of their character is accordingly varied.  
 The methodology I will be employing in this evaluation will be based on Linda 
Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory, which posits that the key designator of a moral 
exemplar is that they are admirable. She argues that the purpose of a moral theory is ‘not to 
give directions in decision-making’ but nevertheless to ‘help us in our practical lives’ 
[Zagzebski, 2010, p.49]. This means that we should not expect the exemplars discussed in 
this research to tell us what we should do to resolve the crisis of plastic pollution, nor what 
our personal relationship with plastic should be, as these are more determined by our 
specific needs and contexts. However, by adopting their attitudes and developing 
dispositions based on their virtuous environmental values, we should be motivated to act 
virtuously.  
 Beginning with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, I will 
examine the theories of libertarian municipalism, as put forward by American philosopher 
Murray Bookchin, and democratic confederalism, as put forward by Kurdish political theorist 
Abdullah Öcalan. These philosophies grew out of a convergence of environmentalism, 
Marxism and anti-imperialism of the twentieth century. I will discuss how these theories lay 
the foundation for how an environmentally virtuous society could be run. These theories 
were built upon by the people of Rojava, who based their political system on Öcalan’s 
philosophy, creating a society around the fundamental principles of feminism, equal 
representation and environmentalism. It will be argued that Rojava is an appropriate 
environmental exemplar due to the fact that its political process employs practical wisdom, 
and has well-entrenched dispositions that lead to positive environmental action. This 
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exemplar provides effective guidance for how to deal with the crisis of plastic pollution by 
showing us how a society can involve environmental values at the foundation of its political 
process.  
 The next chapter explores indigenous attitudes towards the environment in the hope 
of finding relevant environmental exemplars. It will be argued that, despite Hursthouse’s 
doubts at the prospect, both Native American and Aboriginal communities are appropriate 
exemplars due to their deeply established holistic views of the environment, which have 
resulted in the development of environmentally virtuous characters. It will also be argued 
that, despite concerns that their lives are so radically different to ours that the example they 
set cannot be relevant, with the interpretation of the exemplar approach that I adopt, we 
can emulate aspects of their culture in our own and develop similar virtuous dispositions 
towards the environment.  
 The next set of candidates I will discuss are all examples of businesses that cultivate 
an image of environmental responsibility, and yet only one can justifiably be called an 
appropriate environmental exemplar. It will be argued that The Body Shop is an 
environmentally virtuous corporation due to the fact that environmental concerns are 
fundamental to the company’s founding principles, and have not just been viewed as one-
off extra projects. In this chapter I will also discuss what The Body Shop can teach other 
businesses about how to virtuously approach the crisis of plastic pollution. I will also analyse 
why the other candidates, Waitrose and The Coca-Cola Company, fail to be appropriate 
exemplars to varying degrees.  
  The final candidates for environmental exemplars that I will discuss as part of this 
research exist within the UK political system. I will examine the example that the UK 
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government sets through the creation and implementation of its environmental policies, 
and why these fail to give us adequate guidance for how to deal with the crisis of plastic 
pollution. It will also be argued that environmental campaign groups play a key role in 
holding the government to account and fostering efforts at community organising in 
response to the crisis. It will be argued that, for these reasons, campaign groups like Friends 
of the Earth and Surfers Against Sewage are appropriate exemplars of environmental virtue 
that can give us guidance on how to solve the plastic pollution crisis within our current 
political system. 
 Bringing all of the exemplars that I have discovered in this research together in the 
final chapter, I will analyse what traits they have in common, and how we can effectively 
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Chapter 1: What is the issue with plastic pollution and why is it significant for 
Environmental Ethics? 
The main aim of this thesis is to determine how we can employ environmental virtue ethics 
to improve our relationship with plastic. It is therefore necessary to examine our current 
relationship with plastic, the consequences of this relationship for the environment, and 
why it needs to change. The production and disposal of plastic products is having severe and 
wide-ranging effects on our environment. By looking at the statistics on levels of plastic 
pollution in the environment in this chapter, it will be shown that it is a problem that we are 
not currently dealing with effectively and is expected to get worse. It will also be shown that 
the effects are not limited to the non-human environment, as the more plastic waste 
products enter the ecosystem, the more serious the effects on humans become. This 
justifies plastic pollution’s status as a major concern in Environmental Ethics. As the use and 
disposal of plastic is widespread, plastic pollution is also one of the more egalitarian 
problems in Environmental Ethics. This is a term that has been used in various ways by 
moral and political philosophers, in this context it is meant to mean that plastic pollution is a 
problem that everyone contributes to in at least some way, and the average person 
contributes more to the problem than they do to other environmental problems such as 
deforestation or ocean acidification. Plastic pollution is also one of the more egalitarian 
problems in Environmental Ethics because each person can make a change in their lives that 
can have a positive impact on the problem to a greater extent than with other 
environmental problems, increasing the extent to which each moral agent is responsible. It 
will be argued that plastic pollution is a timely current topic in Environmental Ethics due to 
the existing public enthusiasm for the issue, as is evidenced by grassroots campaigns for 
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reducing plastic waste and successful examples of groups pressuring governments. Finally, 
there will be a discussion of the reasons Virtue Ethics is an especially good way of looking at 
the issue of plastic pollution, given its benefits over Utilitarianism in its consideration of the 
needs of the current generation, and the interesting implications of Hursthouse’s 
reformulation of eudaimonia. 
The production and disposal of plastic products has resulted in a situation where 
there is an accumulation of plastic litter in virtually all habitats [Browne et al., 2011]. In our 
oceans, it is estimated that ‘at least 5.25 trillion plastic particles weighing 268,940 tons are 
currently floating at sea’ [Eriksen et al., 2014, p.7]; however, this estimate only accounts for 
‘0.1% of the world annual plastic production’ [p.11] so it can be assumed that the total 
figure is well above this estimate. The abundance of plastic pollutants has already reached 
worrying levels, with one study conducted between 2010 and 2012 finding that the mean 
larval densities of fish in the Danube, Europe’s second largest river, was lower than the 
mean plastic densities, and the average biomass of drifting larval fish was lower than the 
plastic mass [Lechner et al., 2014, p. 179]. This shows that the level of plastic is having 
drastic effects on wildlife and this problem is expected to get even worse in the near future, 
with plastic predicted to be found in the digestive tracts of ‘99% of all seabird species by 
2050’ and ‘95% of the individuals within these species [to have ingested plastic] by the same 
year’ [Wilcox et al., 2015, p.11901-11902]. Some researchers suggest that, by 2050, there 
could be more plastic in the oceans than fish by weight [Sutter, 2016], and it is easy to see 
where this suggestion has come from when looking at the studies already mentioned. This is 
clearly a problem that Environmental Ethics should be concerned with, since our current 
actions with regards to plastic production and disposal are having negative effects on us and 
our environment, and these effects are due to get worse. There have been attempts 
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through environmental ethics to prevent and even reverse the worst effects of plastic 
pollution. However, judging by the situation that we are still facing, it seems not to have 
worked. This suggests that a new approach is needed and, since it is more concerned with 
the formation of habits than other approaches in normative ethics, virtue ethics provides a 
more promising starting point.  
The effects of plastic pollution are not limited to the environment or non-human 
wildlife; as plastic pollution gets worse, there is an increased risk to human health. In their 
2016 paper in Environmental Science and Technology, Vethaak and Leslie observe that ‘what 
started as a marine environmental contamination issue is in fact very much a human health 
issue as well’ as ‘humans are being exposed to both plastic particles and chemical additives 
being released from the plastic debris of consumer society’ [Vethaak and Leslie, 2016, p. 
6825]. The paper identifies three categories of plastic-related health issues, the first of 
which is ‘particle toxicity’ which occurs when plastic particles enter the body and cause 
injuries to the lungs or gut, with ‘specially fine particles’ able to ‘cross cell membranes, the 
blood-brain barrier and the human placenta’. The resulting effects for humans include 
‘oxidative stress, cell damage, inflammation, and impairment of energy allocation functions’ 
[Ibid.]. The second category of health issues caused by plastic is what the authors call 
‘chemical toxicity’, where contaminants in plastic debris which are ‘known endocrine 
disruptors’ can affect human health when ingested or inhaled. It is not just the chemicals 
found in the plastic products themselves, but ‘air and waterborne hydrophobic 
contaminants [that] sorb to plastic litter’, meaning ingestion or inhalation of plastic 
contaminants increases the number of other contaminants that can be damaging to human 
health. As the authors say, ‘exposure to plastic debris means exposure to these chemical 
substances’ [Ibid.]. The third category of plastic-related health issues is ‘pathogen and 
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parasite vectors’ which describes how ‘plastic debris can act as a distinct habitat and 
reservoir for pathogens’. Plastic pollutants can form a thin film on the surface of water 
which can act as ‘a distinct habitat and reservoir for pathogens’ or as a habitat for ‘mosquito 
larvae that transmit parasites or viruses such as Zika or dengue’ [p. 6826]. The multitudinous 
ways in which plastic pollution can be harmful to human health lead to the authors’ 
conclusion that ‘this issue [is] one of the world’s foremost environmental concerns, 
alongside climate change and ocean acidification’ [Ibid.]. It is clear from this evidence that 
plastic pollution is not a problem that just affects wildlife and environment, but one that has 
major negative consequences for human health. It is therefore an incredibly important issue 
for environmental ethics to address, and one with which a wide audience should be 
concerned. 
Another reason I have chosen to focus on plastic specifically, rather than other forms 
of human-produced pollution, is to a certain extent because of the relatively egalitarian 
nature of plastic consumption and disposal. Everyone consumes products that contribute to 
pollution, but none of them are so directly linked to it as plastic is. Almost everyone uses 
electricity and fuel, but we have very little say about how these products are produced. In 
terms of energy, there are some companies we can choose to buy our energy from that use 
a higher proportion of renewable energy sources, but changing the infrastructure that 
produces the majority of energy in any country requires campaigning to convince companies 
or governments to change their policies. The level of choice consumers have is also limited 
to simply how much electricity we use; we cannot decide how the waste products are 
disposed of or whether they can be reused. In terms of fuel, we have even less choice, 
because most cars run on fossil-based fuels and the alternatives can be very expensive or 
inconvenient. That is not to say that plastic does not share some of these problems. Like the 
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other sources of pollution, the majority of the responsibility lies with the producers, the big 
companies that make plastic products for the average consumer to buy. However, in 
comparison to other polluting industries, plastics offer more freedom to the average 
consumer to have a positive impact. There are two main ways in which plastic use leads to 
pollution: (i) the chemical pollution released during its production; and (ii) the chemical and 
physical pollution resulting from its disposal. It is the second way that offers the average 
consumer the opportunity to reduce the level of plastic pollution they cause. As well as 
deciding how much they purchase and use like any other polluting product, they can also 
decide to reuse the plastic they have instead of disposing with it after one use, and when 
they decide to throw it away they can recycle to make sure it does not end up in landfill. 
Even if the consumer decided not to recycle, putting the plastic into the general waste 
disposal means less pollution than littering. This level of choice makes it easier for the 
average person to implement positive changes to their relationship with plastic, while also 
holding companies to account like they would with any other type of pollution; it is for these 
reasons that I believe it to be an egalitarian form of activism, one where everyone shares 
the responsibility and the power to make positive changes, and therefore a good focus for 
my research. 
Another reason for choosing to focus on plastic pollution in this thesis is that there is 
already a general public enthusiasm for dealing with the problem. It is important that this 
general attitude is harnessed in the most effective way, which is why it needs to be assessed 
through an existing system of environmental ethics. This enthusiasm for reducing plastic 
pollution has been voiced by a wide range of organisations from the grassroots movements 
to the biggest corporations and governmental organisations. Examples of grassroots 
campaigns against plastic pollution include The Last Plastic Straw, which puts pressure on 
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the food service industry to make plastic drinking straws ‘a relic of the past’ [Plastic 
Pollution Coalition, 2019], and the Surfers Against Sewage, who suggested a ban on plastic 
straws as part of ‘a five point plan to help create single-use plastic free towns and cities’ 
[Laville, 2019a]. This goal received massive public support and led to the UK government 
announcing in May 2019 that it would introduce a ban on the supply of plastic straws, 
stirrers and cotton buds in the following year [Binding, 2019]. While generally praised for 
being a step in the right direction, there was criticism suggesting that the scope of the 
legislation would not be wide enough, with national and grassroots campaigning 
organisation Friends of the Earth calling for ‘legislation to cut back on pointless plastic 
across the board’ [Friends of the Earth, 2019]. The goals of these movements are not limited 
to small tokens like plastic straws; as already mentioned, the Surfers Against Sewage want 
large-scale change to communities’ relationship with plastic. The group has a long term goal 
to ‘meaningfully shift the way individuals and businesses think about plastic pollution - and 
about our society’s disposable culture on a larger scale’ and they are already working in 
coalition with over one thousand organisations, businesses and thought leaders [Plastic 
Pollution Coalition, 2019]. The fact that these campaigns are so popular and are able to put 
pressure on governments and big businesses shows that there is an existing enthusiasm 
among the general public for positive action on plastic pollution. However, as previously 
discussed, our rate of plastic use and disposal is still increasing showing that not enough is 
being done; a majority of people in the UK want to do more to reduce their plastic use and 
believe that companies should be doing more to combat plastic pollution [Waldersee, 
2019]. It is clear that we need to re-evaluate the problem of plastic pollution, and virtue 
ethics provides a promising starting point for doing so. 
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One of the main sources of opposition to environmental action is the belief that the 
sacrifices needed to tackle the climate crisis are too great, with some even having argued 
that environmentalism is radical and “anti-human” [Baggini, 2012]. Although a view this 
extreme is not held by the majority, the reluctance to give up short-term convenience or 
happiness should not be disregarded. If our goal were to reduce the amount of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere and reverse the trend of rising global temperatures, the quickest 
way to do so would be to completely halt all carbon emissions and begin massive programs 
of carbon capture, which would have a huge, bordering on catastrophic, negative impact on 
our current way of life. As a species we emitted just over thirty-seven billion tons of carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere in 2018, mostly as a result of burning fossil fuels [Harvey, 
2018]. Halting this immediately would leave us with no fuel for the majority of vehicles on 
the roads, no source of energy for most of the power stations that produce our electricity 
and would negatively impact countless manufacturing processes. When looked at through 
the lens of Utilitarianism, in which the goal of any ethical maxim is to maximise utility 
according to the felicific calculus [Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2017], this may be the 
recommended course of action. This is because, while the utility of the current generation 
would be greatly minimised by the kind of action described, to not take this action would 
mean minimising the utility of all future generations on Earth to the extent of risking their 
very survival.  
Since the capacity for utility of all future generations outweighs that of the current 
generation, it is possible that the utilitarian environmental ethicist could decide that it is 
worth sacrificing the current generation by making them bear the costs of an immediate 
transition to a carbon-neutral economy, confirming the worst fears of the anti-
environmentalist. In terms of plastic pollution, the utilitarian may find that the felicific 
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calculus tells us to completely stop using plastic, since a lack of plastic pollution for future 
generations provides more utility overall. Whether or not this kind of action does turn out 
to be more effective overall, having this theory as the basis for action gives too little 
consideration to the living individual and is therefore less likely to be acted upon by the 
majority of agents. I therefore think that the way we deal with plastic pollution in 
environmental ethics needs to be based on Environmental Virtue Ethics, as its ethical 
requirements are less extreme and therefore more likely to be effective.  
Another reason for this thesis’s focus on plastic pollution and Environmental Virtue 
Ethics is that it allows for focus on new and interesting aspects of Virtue Ethics that take the 
priority off of the human agents by defining the ultimate moral good in a more holistic way 
that incorporates the needs of the environment. Rosalind Hursthouse discusses the issue of 
eudaimonia or human flourishing being the primary goal of Virtue Ethics in her 2007 paper 
“Environmental Virtue Ethics”. There is a possible problem with the theory in that efforts 
towards the primary goal of eudaimonia can sometimes be contrary to the needs of the 
environment, leading to a contradiction between Environmental Ethics and Virtue Ethics, 
making the two theories incompatible. Hursthouse highlights that economic growth is not 
what many environmental ethicists want as it is antithetical to conservation. However, to 
those in poorer countries for whom economic growth means an improvement to their and 
their children’s lives, this would not be just. This prompts a question for virtue ethics, 
namely, if eudaimonia or human wellbeing is the top value, then how can we justify making 
people’s lives worse for the sake of the environment? Hursthouse addresses this issue by 
arguing that specifically human flourishing is not the ‘top value’ in virtue ethics and that it 
was never actually supposed to be within our grasp; instead she claims that the top value 
should be ‘acting virtuously’ [Hursthouse, 2007, p.170]. This incorporates all of the virtues 
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because they are bound by each other, we cannot be environmentally conscious to the 
extent that we are unjust because we would not be acting virtuously. This allows a 
reformulation of eudaimonia in order to focus on the flourishing of the environment instead 
of just human society, leading to virtuous attitudes towards plastic are ones that benefit the 
community as a whole including the nonhuman members of the environment. Hursthouse 
also takes away the moral justification for profit motives because, while they may benefit 
humans, the environment has no use for money and does not benefit from human profit. As 
well as being useful for Environmental Ethics, the issue of plastic pollution therefore allows 
an interesting discussion to be had about Virtue Ethics in general.  
It is clear that plastic pollution is a rich topic in the subject of Environmental Ethics. 
The scale of the problem means that this type of discussion is essential, especially given our 
current inability or unwillingness to deal with it. It is also a problem that effects every 
person, but one that everyone can have a positive impact on in a number of ways. Given the 
widespread nature of plastic use and disposal, there is a good chance that the problem can 
be addressed through cultivating virtuous dispositions that lead to more environmentally 
friendly actions. The focus on cultivation of virtuous dispositions instead of unmoving 
requirements of action based on abstract equations means that Environmental Virtue Ethics 
is likely to be more effective in getting people to make positive changes to their 
relationships with plastics. Finally, it is clear that the issue of plastic pollution gives us the 
opportunity to discuss the priorities of Virtue Ethics, since a focus on the flourishing of the 
community that only takes into account the human members of that community, and only 
in the short-term, is too narrow a focus for environmental virtue ethics. Now that we know 
the scale of the plastic pollution crisis, we can move on to talking about how we can solve it. 
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In the next chapter I will discuss the exemplar approach to virtue ethics and why it is the 
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Chapter 2: Foundation of the Exemplar Approach to Virtue Ethics 
In the previous chapter we saw how necessary a new approach to environmental ethics is if 
we want to solve the plastic pollution crisis. In this chapter I will examine the approach that 
this thesis will take to achieve this goal in the form of the exemplar approach. In order to do 
so I will attempt to answer two important questions: (i) how do we determine which 
dispositions are virtuous?; and (ii) how do we develop a virtuous character? One of the most 
important considerations in the subject of environmental virtue ethics is how we know what 
virtues are. Traditional Virtue Ethics defines virtue as more than just the performance of an 
action, but as a character trait, a well-entrenched disposition of an agent that necessarily 
leads to moral action [Hursthouse and Pettigrove, 2018]. This is an important specification 
that means virtue ethics is agent-centred rather than action-centred because the focus of 
the theory is on helping agents develop their character rather than simply acting in certain 
ways. This makes virtue ethics practical because the development of a virtuous character 
and the insistence on the fecundity of virtue, in that it always leads to some form of action, 
means that a person with a virtuous character will necessarily act virtuously. While this 
distinction answers the questions of what a virtue is and what a virtue does, it does not get 
us any closer to being virtuous when we read it. If I wanted to know how to be morally good 
and I asked a divine command theorist, they might say that I must not do anything that is 
contrary to God’s commands [Pojman and Rea, 2008, pp.561-562]. I would then know 
exactly what was forbidden and what was permitted. However, with the Virtue Ethics 
definition of virtue, I cannot be moral unless my actions come organically from a virtuous 
disposition, so I do not know how to act, and the only guidance for how to develop a 
virtuous disposition is to discover the virtues. These virtues are not simple commands that 
Page | 17  
 
apply to everyone as in divine command theory, but apply specifically to my own situation 
and therefore I must work them out for myself. Therefore, the pressing questions for Virtue 
Ethics are how we determine which dispositions are virtuous and how we develop a virtuous 
character. This takes away from one of the main selling-points of Virtue Ethics – that it is 
practical. A system of ethics that does not give us a guide for action is much less appealing 
than one that does, even if it has stronger theoretical foundations. There are many 
interpretations within virtue ethics of the criteria of good action, but perhaps the most 
useful in terms of answering this question by giving us a guide for action is the exemplarist 
approach. Agent-based virtue ethicists such as Zagzebski argue that the moral value of an 
action is based upon whether it is the kind of action that a virtuously motivated person 
would do. From this, Zagzebski asserts that we can look to exemplars of moral virtue in 
order to determine which dispositions are virtuous, and therefore we can develop a virtuous 
character by imitating these dispositions. There have been many criticisms of virtue ethics in 
general and the exemplar approach in particular. The most significant and relevant of these 
will be discussed in this chapter, with the aim being to determine whether an examination 
of possible exemplars is worthwhile and what issues need to be taken into account when 
doing so.  
The exemplarist approach is an approach to Virtue Ethics put forward by Linda 
Zagzebski as a methodology of learning what the virtues are by looking at the behaviour of 
other people, which she justifies by the fact that it is consistent with the way in which 
people learn naturally, arguing that ‘moral learning, like most other learning, is principally 
done by imitation’ [2013, p.200]. She therefore defines exemplars as ‘those persons who are 
most imitable’, in the sense that we can clearly see from studying their character how we 
should be. They are most imitable because they are ‘most admirable’, in the sense that the 
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moral value of their character traits is clearly identifiable [ibid.]. She argues that the 
function of admiration is essential to the theory because it ‘can be used to give us both a 
way of understanding significant moral concepts and a way of using those concepts to make 
ourselves and our lives to conform to the admirable’ [p.201]. Imitation can help us 
understand moral concepts by familiarising us with moral dilemmas and habituating the 
appropriate responses to these dilemmas. In this way, Zagzebski is proposing her conception 
of the exemplar approach to Virtue Ethics as a direct answer to the questions with which 
this chapter is concerned.  
We can see that Zagzebski’s answer to the first question would be to follow our 
natural feelings of admiration for others and find a person that we admire; their character 
will therefore be, by virtue of being admirable, a virtuous character. Zagzebski’s proposed 
answer to the second question is that we should attempt to imitate their actions and 
dispositions, to ask ourselves ‘what would they do if they were in my situation’ until we 
reach a point where the answer comes naturally to us without us having to ask. It should be 
said that Zagzebski’s conception of what the imitation of admirable people entails is not 
necessarily one that entails simply copying their actions, but instead involves considering 
their approach to situations and the ethical values that they hold. This is an especially 
important distinction in the context of my research because, when looking at possible 
exemplars for plastic use, it is likely to be much more difficult to copy their behaviour than it 
would be to adopt their attitude when applying it to society in general. For example, we 
cannot all have exactly the same relationship with the environment as indigenous tribes or 
historical societies who had not discovered a way of mass-producing plastic, since there are 
some plastic products (e.g. medical equipment) that we would deem essential. However, we 
may be able to imitate the underlying attitude to the natural environment and approach our 
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own circumstances from the context of those attitudes, deciding for ourselves how they can 
be applied or adapted to our own situations.  
One problem people tend to have with Virtue Ethics in general is that it does not 
fulfil their expectations of what an ethical theory should do, namely, that it should give us a 
decision-making framework for determining the most moral thing to do in any situation. 
This means that when a person hears the tenets of the theory they should immediately 
know what is moral and what is not. The exemplar approach does not provide this 
framework, it instead asks us to imagine for ourselves what a virtuous person would do 
were they to find themselves in our situation. This is not a flaw in the theory, but a benefit, 
as theories that provide decision-making frameworks do not necessarily help in every 
situation. When making common ethical decisions, it is not always practical to be act-
centred in my approach. When I am in the shop trying to choose whether to get regular 
coffee or pay more for fair-trade coffee, it would be impractical for me to apply the Kantian 
categorical imperative or the utilitarian felicific calculus. Instead my decision to choose the 
fair-trade coffee comes from the fact that I usually choose fair-trade coffee, making the 
process simpler. If I were I to reflect on the reason why I usually choose it, it would be 
because that is what a virtuous person, someone who is disposed to act virtuously, would 
choose. In other words, the motivation for choosing the coffee is dispositional, but the 
intention behind my choice was to be virtuous. Under Kantian ethics I would have not done 
something morally good because my motivation was dispositional, rather than determined 
by knowledge of my duty [Kant, 1993, 213-214]. At the other end of the scale, there are 
situations that are so morally complex that the guidance given by other theories is not 
enough, and the agent – be they a surgeon, an emergency worker, a politician or a judge – 
are forced to use the judgement they have developed from their experience in making 
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similar decisions. This judgement is what Aristotle called phronesis [Aristotle and Bekker, 
2019, 1106b35], in order to make a decision. It is therefore not necessarily the case that the 
decision-making framework other theories provide is better or more effective than Virtue 
Ethics, but the theory does acknowledge the need for a practical wisdom and, as Ronald L. 
Sandler says, ‘no ethical theory can eliminate the need for good situational judgment, 
regardless of how 'mechanical' or 'codifiable' its rules and principles’ [Sandler, 2007, p.99]. 
In terms of being a good guide for someone who is not morally good and has not yet begun 
to develop or adhere to a moral theory, whom I will refer to as the neutral agent, the 
exemplar approach does not rely exclusively on acting like the exemplars. Aristotle says that 
virtue is a mean between two extremes [1103b-1104b] and the neutral agent can aim for 
the opposite extreme to the one at which they find themselves as a starting point for finding 
the mean, which is the ultimate goal. In doing so, by the time that they discover what the 
virtuous mean is, they will already have begun to move towards it. Zagzebski says that the 
exemplar approach must occur in stages in many cases. She says that the neutral agent 
should start by ‘focusing first on acquiring the traits of exemplars’ before moving on to 
‘direct imitation of the exemplar’ [Zagzebski, 2013, p.203]. This staged model of the 
development of virtues is a way for the neutral agent to begin applying the theory 
immediately, just not necessarily in its full form. This is consistent in Virtue Ethics because of 
the holistic focus on developing a moral character over time, but it still does not entirely 
fulfil the expectation that ethical theories should tell us exactly what to do in any given 
situation, but as already discussed, trying to get such guidance from theories like 
utilitarianism or Kantian ethics is also (if not more) impractical. Overall this shows that virtue 
ethics is the approach to be adopted when looking at the issue of plastic pollution, since it is 
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not just our actions in limited situations that have to change but our whole attitude towards 
the environment.  
Another objection to the exemplar approach to Virtue Ethics is the charge of cultural 
relativism, a charge that the exemplar approach exacerbates. The problem is that defining 
virtue is relative to your role in society or, as environmental virtue ethicists want to do, in 
the ecosystem. Alasdair MacIntyre acknowledges that different cultures embody different 
virtues [MacIntyre, 1985], and so what is morally good depends on what culture you are 
part of. This is a major problem if one wants to prescribe a policy, let alone reorganise 
society based on the theory, since the virtues that are relevant to one culture are different 
to those in all the others, and therefore it is not fair to impose rules on another because 
there is no way of adjudicating what the rules should be. It also presents an issue in the 
sense that adopting an exemplar approach will not change anything, since our exemplars, if 
taken from our culture, will embody our culture and so our culture will not change; and any 
exemplar from a different culture cannot be adopted by our culture because it is not 
relevant. Perhaps the best response to these charges is that cultural relativity is less of a 
problem for virtue ethics than it is for other ethical theories. This is because in virtue ethics 
the differences between cultures tend to be explained as a difference in the application and 
prioritisation of virtues, rather than the actual core virtues being different [Nussbaum, 
1993]. Whereas other theories take the requirements of moral action as necessary, and 
therefore impose the same requirements on everyone regardless of culture. This is different 
to virtue ethics, in which the underlying values (e.g. justice, empathy, humility) are the same 
but can be instantiated in different ways according to different circumstances and still be 
called virtuous. This idea that there is an underlying set of virtues that are shared between 
cultures is consistent with traditional views of Virtue Ethics because debates about what 
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each virtue is tend to be about different but close points on the same scale between the 
same extremes [Peterson and Seligman, 2004]. For example, virtue ethicists have debated 
the importance of the virtue of courage and exactly how much courage is virtuous, but all 
the different positions are on a scale between the excesses of rashness and the deficiency of 
cowardice. We can also look to the way we determine what the virtues are in order to prove 
that we can change our values within a Virtue Ethics system. Taking admiration and 
imitation as the basis for virtue we can adopt the virtues of other cultures, since we can 
admire those outside our culture, and therefore by imitating them we can cultivate virtues 
that are new to our culture. This of course requires that we properly understand that which 
we admire in other cultures and the cultures themselves in order to ensure that we are not 
just adopting an inaccurate simulacrum of another culture. Assuming that this is possible, it 
means that virtue ethics is not limited by cultural relativism except in the way that our 
culture influences who we are likely to admire, so the effect that culture has on virtue is 
equalled by the effect that virtue has on culture.  In the wider context of this research, it is 
clear that cultural relativism is an important consideration. However, it is possible for one 
culture to have an effect on another in Virtue Ethics, a characteristic that makes virtue 
ethics an appropriate approach to be adopted when studying environmental ethics. It is 
therefore worthwhile assessing possible exemplars in other cultures, both contemporary 
and historical, and it is also likely that the conclusions drawn on who the best exemplars of 
virtuous plastic consumption will be applicable across cultures. The most important impact 
the issue of cultural relativity needs to have on research is that environmental exemplars 
must be taken from a wide range of cultures in order to avoid one or more cultures being 
impacted disproportionately by the adoption of virtues from other cultures.  
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We have seen that the definition of virtue given by traditional virtue ethics means 
that one cannot be virtuous just by performing virtuous acts, since Virtue Ethics is not act-
based but agent-based. Instead the moral value comes from a virtuous character. One 
therefore needs to cultivate a virtuous character, which some virtue ethicists say can be 
achieved by imitating those who already have virtuous characters – virtuous exemplars. One 
objection to this approach is that it does not give us a decision-making framework to deal 
with every ethical quandary, but as we have seen there is no ethical theory that can do this 
adequately, and only Virtue Ethics has an account of the practical wisdom necessary to 
make the most difficult decisions. It is also criticised for not being immediately applicable to 
the neutral agent, the person who has not yet begun to develop a moral theory. However, 
Zagzebski’s account of a staged exemplar approach show an effective way around the 
problem. The other major objection to Virtue Ethics is that it is limited by cultural relativism, 
but as we have seen, the culturally relative aspects of Virtue Ethics is actually a strength 
rather than a weakness as it allows for a more all-encompassing and applicable ethical 
framework. It also highlights the need for a culturally diverse Environmental Virtue Ethics 
with a wide range of exemplars, taking them from a small group of cultures will suffer from 
all the negative aspects of cultural relativism. Overall, once these issues are taken into 
account, it will be worthwhile to examine the crisis of plastic pollution from an exemplar 
approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics. In the next chapter I will examine another of the 
main contributors to the plastic pollution crisis, capitalism, in an attempt to show the 
limitations of what the exemplar approach can achieve. 
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Chapter 3: To what extent does the economic system of capitalism contribute to the 
problem of plastic pollution? 
We have seen some of the strengths and weaknesses of the exemplar approach to virtue 
ethics, but there are also external factors that will influence the effectiveness of the 
approach. In this chapter I will examine the extent to which free-market capitalism 
contributes to the plastic pollution crisis and its consequences for this research. The 
problem of plastic pollution is inherently linked to the issue of consumption. Plastic 
products are produced by companies in order to meet the demands of consumers, who 
then decide when and, to an extent, how to dispose of them. The primary factor in the rate 
of plastic production, and consequently pollution, is the market. If our aim is to discover a 
solution to the problem of plastic pollution, then it is important to know which factors are 
fixed and which are vulnerable to change. In this chapter I will use aspects of the social 
sciences to examine how the system of capitalism contributes to the problem of plastic 
pollution through the manipulation of demand, the myth of the free market, and the 
prioritisation of profit over the social good. In examining these things in detail, I intend to 
show that our economic system in its current form1 is, for the most part, incompatible with 
a virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics, and therefore such an approach cannot be 
implemented in the most effective way while capitalism is still the dominant ideology. That 
is not to say that it would not be better than it currently is were we to implement 
environmental virtue ethics within capitalism, but to make clear that a lot of what I discuss 
 
1   There are a variety of economic systems in the world that can be broadly described as capitalist. For the 
purposes of this chapter the term will be used to refer to economic systems in which private companies 
control the means of production in trade and industry and compete in the nominally free market. 
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in this paper in terms of what needs to happen are in the context of capitalism’s continued 
existence, and would not be necessary if the system were to change.  
Karl Marx’s notion of ‘cultural deception’ argues that capitalist ideology deceives us 
by leading us to believe that there is a free market, that the worker and consumer are free, 
and that any problem can be solved through consumption [Marx, 2009]. This cultural 
deception prevents us from dealing with a problem that is necessarily related to plastic 
pollution. Under capitalism, the so-called “free market” is said to be the most efficient way 
of distributing resources and producing products [Popper, 1994]. In order for this to be the 
case there need to be free associations between individuals at every stage of the market 
process. Consumers must be able to make free decisions about what they buy in order to 
influence what producers produce. However, the consumers are not free to make informed 
choices because the production process is hidden from them in many cases. For example, 
when buying electrical goods, consumers are not informed about the use of slave labour to 
mine precious metals like coltan and cobalt for use in the production of those goods that 
they are buying [UN, 2001]. If consumers are not informed about the products that they buy 
then the decision to buy them is not a free one and so the market is not free. Consumers 
also have their purchasing freedom limited by a lack of money. Many people cannot afford 
to buy the products that would be their first choice because they are out of their price 
range, and therefore they have to buy the cheaper, inferior product. They therefore cannot 
freely influence the market by indicating which products are best, and so the market is not 
free. Consumers are also affected by the fact that companies do not necessarily have to 
provide an ethical option. When a company operates a monopoly on a product, or two or 
more companies produce similar products through similarly unethical processes, then the 
only free ethical choice the consumer can make is not to consume. However, when these 
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products are essential, as Beckman, DeAngelo and Smith point out, the consumer can be 
presented with a ‘pay or die choice’ [Beckman, DeAngelo and Smith, 2015, p.6462]. 
Consumers are therefore denied even this small amount of freedom in interactions with 
what they call ‘dictator monopolies’, and so the market is not free. 
Workers are unable to make free associations with those that employ them because 
they do not compete on the same footing as the company for which they work and 
therefore cannot sell their labour for what it is actually worth. The choice that they are 
forced to make is between taking a wage that is necessarily lower than the value of their 
labour, or trying to find a job with a different employer that is willing to pay what your 
labour is worth. The second option is not particularly realistic since almost all employers 
exclusively employ waged workers, and in order to avoid starving, they are almost always 
forced to take the first option. Since workers do not have a share in the means of 
production, they cannot have free associations with those that do, and those that do have 
no incentive to increase the power of the workers, or to sacrifice their profit margins by 
paying the workers what their labour is actually worth [Bivens and Mishel, 2015].  
Perhaps the issue most relevant to environmental ethics is also the most pertinent 
issue with the capitalist free market: the profit incentive. The mechanics of the free market 
mean that “efficiency” is measured by how profitable a company is, and nothing else. This 
means that producers will always be rewarded for prioritising their own financial good over 
the social or environmental good. This is a problem that also exacerbates the other 
problems that have already been discussed. A producer can make their products more 
appealing to consumers by making their production process more socially environmentally 
responsible, but even if it leads to them selling more units or being more in-demand, they 
Page | 27  
 
will only measure the success of the move in terms of financial gain, and as soon as that gain 
goes away, they will go back to normal to protect it. Ethical producers (in as far as they exist 
outside of the purely theoretical realm) cannot therefore compete freely with unethical 
producers, since profit is the only incentive in the free market, so the market is not free.  
It is important to note that the existence of any one of these problems with the free 
market would mean that it was not truly free and therefore could not be interacted with in 
a virtuous way. It just so happens that no interaction that occurs under capitalism is truly 
free, and the founding principle of capitalism is completely contradictory to those of virtue 
ethics. If we expect companies to act in an environmentally sustainable way while still 
operating in a system where profit is the primary goal then we are always going to be 
disappointed. Using plastic to make their products is cheaper and easier than sustainable 
alternatives, meaning they can produce more products more quickly. The wider costs of this 
decision must be given more weight because, as it currently stands, the only factors that 
dictate what is produced and how are the economic factors. This narrow view of the costs of 
plastic production contributes hugely to the plastic pollution crisis.  
Another way in which the capitalist system exacerbates the problem of plastic 
pollution is through what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno referred to as ‘cultural 
deception’ [Scannell, 2007, p.37-44]. According to this theory, there is a difference between 
‘authentic culture’, which makes up everything we use to live and understand the world, 
and the so-called ‘culture industry’, which produces standardised cultural goods that meet 
the needs it has artificially created ‘for the purpose of pacifying society’ [Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 2002, p.107]. The effect of this culture industry on plastic pollution can be seen 
through its proliferation of unnecessary plastic products. According to Adorno and 
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Horkheimer’s theory, the culture industry sells its products by creating an artificial need for 
them that goes beyond the true psychological needs demarcated by Herbert Marcuse 
[Marcuse, 1996, p.136]. This can clearly be seen when it comes to single-use plastic 
packaging, like for bottled water, as humans need water to live, but that need can be met 
without the extensive use of plastic that we have now. We have clean water plumbed into 
every home in the UK, there are reusable and sustainable options for carrying that water 
with us in the form of water bottles. We are sold bottled water under the pretence that it is 
more convenient, purer and healthier than tap water despite the fact that more than half of 
all bottled water comes from a tap and that it costs almost two thousand times more and 
has a massive negative effect on the environment [Food & Water Watch, 2020]. In this way 
the culture industry creates demand where there is none, and in turn contributes to the 
ongoing climate disaster. Using this framework, we can identify the plastic products that are 
completely unnecessary and should be banned; which products are only needed in very 
small quantities and should therefore be produced as such; and which we actually need. 
This is only possible if we are able to move away from a system where profit is the only 
motive, as capitalists make no attempt to distinguish between necessity and excess. Any 
attempt to reform the current system, such as by demanding that companies be made to 
produce biodegradable or recycled products, or that governments make water fountains 
more widely accessible, or provide plastic recycling bins in public spaces will not go far 
enough, quickly enough to solve the problem because retaining the core capitalist principle 
of the profit motive means there will always be a temptation for companies to put profit 
first. This is not to say that a capitalist system that implements these reforms would not be 
better than what we have now, but without at least acknowledging the influence that 
cultural deception has on our demand for plastic, we cannot fully solve the crisis. The 
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problem that essentially boils down to too much consumption can only be solved by 
reducing consumption, not by continuing to consume but in a slightly different way. Small 
adjustments might improve the situation, or put off the worst effects, but a large-scale 
systemic change is needed to solve the underlying problem. 
 
 The problem of plastic pollution is inarguably caused and exacerbated by the 
capitalist economic system under which we live. As has been shown, the myth of the free 
market deceives us into thinking that only the best products and services, as well as the 
companies that produce them, will survive. It also leads us to believe that we can 
meaningfully affect the world by consuming in an ethical way - i.e. by buying the most 
sustainable products that are available. On the contrary, the market is not free in any 
meaningful sense of the word, and continued participation in it, even through seemingly 
ethical consumption, will only reinforce an inherently unsustainable and environmentally 
damaging system. We have seen that the primary reason the capitalist system is so 
damaging to the environment is that it prioritises profit over the social good. The free 
market system only cares about financial gain at the cost to workers, customers, society and 
environment. This makes it completely incompatible with a system of ethics that values the 
benefit of society through virtuous dispositions in accordance with moderation over the 
individualistic pursuit of financial gain. This incompatibility means that neither theory can 
properly be put into practise at the same time as the other, one must be discarded, and 
after looking at all of the ways that the free market negatively affects society and the 
environment, it is difficult to see how any person that claims to value those things could 
choose capitalism. Lastly, it has been shown how capitalists use cultural deception to create 
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demand, increase plastic pollution, and damage the environment, where it is otherwise 
completely unnecessary. This is a process that will always happen as long as profit is the 
only reason companies make products. We therefore cannot escape from the 
environmental disaster that capitalism caused by continuing to prop up the free market. We 
cannot consume our way out of a problem that is, at its heart, excessive consumption 
caused by the pursuit of profit.  
In terms of the wider scope of this research, the conclusions drawn from this chapter 
must be taken into consideration in any subsequent discussion of environmental virtue, for 
capitalism casts a long shadow, one which affects any discussion of how we order society. 
This means that any recommendation for how we change our relationship with plastic will 
be bound up with our relationship with consumption in general, and therefore the results of 
any such change will depend on what influence the free market continues to have. The 
candidates for environmentally virtuous exemplars may or may not exist in a capitalist 
system. For those that do, their potential to be exemplary will be affected by the relative 
virtue of that system and so they will likely be unable to attain the same level of virtue as 
those who do not. For those that do not exist in a capitalist system, their potential to be 
exemplary may be higher, but this is somewhat weakened by the possibility that it would be 
more difficult to emulate them in a capitalist system. This is because the more differences 
there are between the circumstances of the exemplar and the agent, the harder it is for the 
latter to find moral guidance that applies to their situation. There are factors that need to 
be considered when living in a capitalist system that may not under another system, 
meaning it is not always obvious what the exemplar would do in the agent’s situation. We 
may have to accept that no one person can fully live up to the standard of virtue set in a 
non-capitalist system while they exist in a capitalist one.  
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Chapter 4: How do we identify environmental exemplars? 
Now that we have seen some of the limitations imposed on the exemplar approach by 
capitalism, we can move on to discussing how best to identify exemplars of environmental 
virtue. There seems to be a certain circularity to the process of identifying exemplars in 
virtue ethics. Any formal attempt to identify an appropriate exemplar would likely need to 
start with some criteria for what makes a person virtuous so that we know what we are 
looking for. However, in the exemplar approach to virtue ethics, we can only learn what the 
virtuous character is with reference to a virtuous agent. It therefore seems that we need the 
virtues to identify the virtuous, and the virtuous to identify the virtues. There are a few 
possible ways around this problem. The first way is to look at the Aristotelean idea of the 
golden mean and which of the character traits Aristotle described are relevant to 
environmental ethics. The second is to look, as we have briefly already done, at Zagzebski’s 
idea of admiration as the main signifier of the virtuous character.  
Aristotle’s starting points for moral considerations in the Nichomachean Ethics, and 
their development into criteria of virtue, could give us a starting point or a framework for 
identifying exemplars. His belief in practical reason and building on our inherent wisdom 
and experience of everyday virtuous actions [Burnyeat, 1980, pp.71-72] fits together with 
Zagzebski’s concept of exemplars as ‘admirable’ moral agents [Zagzebski, 2010, p.41], and 
could therefore be combined with it in order to solve the circular problem of identifying 
exemplars. Aristotle’s theory is also particularly appropriate for the conversation about 
environmental exemplarism because it has a foundational concern for humans’ natural 
function as a part of their environment. Keeping this founding principle in mind throughout 
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our discussion of environmental virtue will be vital to finding the right criteria for an 
environmental exemplar. 
Aristotle’s theories, and their phylogenetic foundations have always had a close 
association with environmental ethics. Aristotle’s early taxonomy defined a species by what 
they can do that no other living organism can, in other words their ecological niche 
[Aristotle, 1888, 1098b22-1098a15]. For humans, Aristotle saw this as the ability to reason. 
Although the defining feature of humanity in this view is what sets it apart from nature, it at 
the same time ensures that the relationship with the natural world is equally defining. This 
makes Aristotle’s taxonomy an excellent foundational theory for environmental ethics.  
One criticism of Aristotle’s phylogenetic reasoning is that it suffers from the is-ought 
problem. This is a problem that was most famously described (though not in reference to 
Aristotle) by David Hume, who in his 1739 work A Treatise on Human Nature observed that 
many authors justified their ethical beliefs by writing about the way things are and are not, 
before switching to talking about how things ought and ought not to be. He writes that it is 
‘necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason 
should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it’ [Hume and Selby-Bigge, 1888]. 
Aristotle, in his founding of Virtue Ethics, could be accused of committing this fallacy by 
asserting that human reason is what sets us apart from the rest of nature, and therefore 
human beings are right to use reason, i.e. that reason is morally good. This view, however, 
mistakes the moral assertion that Virtue Ethics is making, confusing the method for the goal, 
as if Aristotle had come across a hammer and decided that it must be the best tool for every 
job by virtue of it being the only tool he had. The moral choice does not come as a result of 
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Aristotle’s discovery of our ability to use reason but putting that moral choice into action 
does require the use of reason, which is a subtle but important difference. In the case of 
environmental virtue ethics, the moral choice is to act in accordance with environmental 
virtue in order to preserve the environment and the survival of humanity; our ability to 
reason only comes into use because it will help us to achieve these goals. The argument 
being made by Virtue Ethics is not ‘we can use reason, therefore we ought to use reason’; it 
is instead: ‘it is good to be virtuous, reason can help us discover what the virtues are, so we 
ought to use reason’. It is saying that if you want to be virtuous, you need to use your 
natural ability to reason so that you can discover what the virtues are, just as if you want to 
knock in a nail, you are going to need a hammer. 
Aristotle saw the ability to reason as the main tool for discovering the ‘golden mean’ 
between the extremes of human behaviour and character. For example, the golden mean of 
courage lies somewhere between the vices of cowardice and foolhardiness, and we can use 
reason to find where exactly it does lie. The golden mean is not fixed for any of the virtues, 
since Aristotle says ‘to feel these feelings at the right time, on the right occasion, towards 
the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of 
them’ [Aristotle, 1888, 1106b11]. The virtuous disposition for one person will be different to 
that of another, as it is based on their role in the community. The virtue of courage will be 
closer to foolhardiness for a soldier than it will for a shopkeeper, for whom it will lean more 
towards cowardice. However, it is not the same in every situation. A soldier on leave will not 
need the same level of courage as when he is at war, a shopkeeper will need more courage 
when confronting a shoplifter than dealing with a customer. The virtues are not dependent 
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on the person and their role in society, but also on the situations that they find themselves 
in. 
When it comes to environmental virtues, the golden mean might fall between 
ascetism – the avoidance of all kinds of indulgence – and overconsumption – the use of 
more resources than the ecosystem can sustainably support. The golden mean on this scale 
could be referred to as sustainable consumption. Where this golden mean lies would, as 
previously shown, be different for different individuals or groups; one person may have to 
be closer to ascetic in their disposition than a company that serves the needs of many. 
Someone whose livelihood relies on them travelling a lot will consume more than someone 
who works from home; a country that relies on fossil fuels to support its population will find 
their golden mean leans more towards overconsumption than a country that has renewable 
energy infrastructure. The golden mean for environmental virtue also changes based on the 
situation people find themselves in. Someone who often gets the opportunity to indulge will 
need to be more disposed to ascetism than one who rarely does, since their indulgence over 
time will be more damaging to the environment. For example, someone that gets to go on a 
foreign holiday every year should consider ways to make the environmental impact of their 
holiday as low as possible much more than the person who only gets to go on a foreign 
holiday once in their lifetime.  
In terms of production there is an excess of productivity and unproductiveness, with 
the golden mean between the two being efficiency. An example is the production of bottled 
water, which as previously discussed leads to a huge amount of plastic pollution. It would be 
more virtuous for producers to be closer to unproductiveness because there are better 
alternatives in most situations. However, they cannot go too far because there are 
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situations where bottled water is necessary, such as ensuring that people have access to 
clean water, so there cannot be no production. Therefore, the virtuous level of bottled 
water production is in between the two, but closer to unproductiveness than productivity.   
Aristotle’s concept of the golden mean gives us an idea of the kind of characteristics 
we need in order to be virtuous, or at least the kind of characteristics we should be 
avoiding, but it does not go far enough in telling us exactly what the virtues are for us, nor 
does it give us the tools to work it out for ourselves. It is all very well saying that the perfect 
amount of courage or empathy is different for each person in each situation, but how do I 
know how much courage and empathy I need specifically? It is also difficult to separate 
individual aspects of our character – single virtues – and try to determine them in isolation. 
By their very nature as dispositional characteristics, the virtues are intertwined with and 
affect each other, and therefore are best viewed and interacted with holistically as a whole 
character. This is where the exemplar approach comes in and can be used to guide our 
reasoning, as by identifying exemplars whose characters we can emulate, we can determine 
the golden means for our situations by referring to theirs, eventually becoming disposed to 
act in the most virtuous way.  
Linda Zagzebski approaches Virtue Ethics from a completely different angle to 
Aristotle, but there are similarities and developments in the reasoning behind her 
arguments that mean a synthesis between the two is possible and could make both 
approaches more effective. Zagzebski argues that the main purpose of a moral theory is ‘not 
to give directions in decision making’ [Zagzebski, 2010, p.49], so we cannot expect the 
exemplarist approach to tell us what actions are right and wrong; however she does argue 
that ‘it is an advantage if a theory can help us in our practical lives’ and through the 
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exemplarist approach she aims to do this by giving us a method for working it out for 
ourselves. This is a classic Virtue Ethics approach, which has always been concerned with 
practical wisdom (phronesis) and the development of one’s moral character than the 
morality of any single situation [Aristotle, 1888, 1105b25-26]. We already have a practical 
wisdom, which Zagzebski and Aristotle agree comes most crucially from education and the 
everyday moral interactions, stories and socialisation that it shapes. This established 
practical wisdom helps us to determine approximately where the golden mean lies, but as 
we have seen, it is not enough to develop a moral disposition.  
Zagzebski also indirectly contributes to the debate around the is/ought problem by 
basing her theory on the Putnam-Kripke theory of direct reference [p.49-50]. She says that, 
in saying that someone is good, we are pointing to something in the world and saying that 
they are “like that”, fixing ‘the term “good person” without the use of descriptive concepts’ 
[p.51]. The effect that this has is to make the definition of a good person contingent on the 
way the world is, without committing to an a priori claim. The person is picked out only 
because we admire them in some way, and in saying that they are good we refer only to this 
fact. Zagzebski says that the exemplarist theory ‘is compatible with the possibility that 
paradigmatically good individuals are only contingently good’ [p.52]. This means that claims 
about oughts are not absolute claims, as they do not apply outside of the system in which 
the definitions were fixed, they are therefore relative to that system of definitions. It is 
therefore the stages of identifying a morally virtuous exemplar are to say ‘that person is 
admirable, therefore that person is good, therefore we ought to emulate them if we want to 
be good’, since the definition of ‘good’ is contingent on its pointing to ‘admirable’, and the 
definition of admirable ‘carries with it the impetus to imitate’ [p.54]. Zagzebski proposes 
Page | 37  
 
that ‘the process of creating a highly abstract structure to simplify and justify our moral 
practices is rooted in ... the practice of identifying exemplars [and in] the experience of 
admiration, shaped by the narratives of the human condition’. Put simply she is claiming 
that those we admire are morally virtuous, and in emulating their admirable behaviour we 
can develop a virtuous character. There is a potential problem here, because we do not 
necessarily always admire the right people, and so saying that people are should be 
emulated because they are admired is a bit of a leap. However, as we shall see, this is where 
knowledge of the virtues and our education can help us to admire the right people and to 
separate those that we should emulate from those that we should not.  
One criticism of the exemplarist theory of Virtue Ethics is that it assumes that moral 
beliefs are sufficient to motivate one to perform morally good actions, in the sense that 
Zazebski claims that admiration leads to a desire to emulate. If this is not true, and people 
are not sufficiently motivated to act by their admiration of others and the moral beliefs that 
admiration implies, then the exemplarist theory fails. Although the purpose of virtue ethics 
is to develop dispositions in agents so that moral motivation is not necessary, Zagzebski’s 
exemplarist approach introduces the need for motivation in order to emulate the 
exemplars, and therefore it must be justified. Natasza Szutta points this out and argues that 
‘one can point to vast empirical data (e.g. neuroscientific studies) that strongly suggest that 
this assumption [that moral beliefs lead to moral actions] is false’ [Szutta, 2019, pp. 281]. 
Szutta puts forward the example of Phineas Gage, a construction worker who surprisingly 
survived when an explosion sent a tamping rod shooting through his head, causing brain 
damage to the extent that his friends described him as ‘no longer Gage’ [Harlow, 1868, 
p.327-47]. The argument for this is unnecessarily weak. Referring to cases of people with 
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brain damage may prove that it does not necessarily follow that moral beliefs cause moral 
action; it does not disprove that under normal circumstances (i.e. in the vast majority of 
cases), those who have strong moral beliefs are committed to moral actions. In searching for 
a way to disprove the claim that Zagzebski makes, one needs only to look at all the times 
that someone has acted in direct contradiction to their moral principles. People that are 
perfectly capable of making and carrying out decisions and have no external obstacle to 
doing so outside of their own motivation, often act in a way that they know and freely admit 
is in some way morally wrong. So, if these people were to see someone admirable, although 
they might agree that they are admirable and that they should be emulated, this does not 
mean that they will definitely emulate them. For an example of this phenomenon we can 
look at littering. In a study conducted in Bahrain on attitudes to public littering, ninety-three 
percent of respondents said they believed that the public hold at least some responsibility 
for cleanliness, and evidence showed that littering is widely recognised as an irresponsible 
behaviour in the country. Yet less than seventy-five percent of respondents to the study said 
that they never litter, and forty-six percent gave no reason for doing so [Freije, Naser & 
Abdulla, 2019, pp.357-358, Fig. 2]. This means that there are at least eighteen percent of the 
respondents who know that they have a responsibility not to litter, and yet do it anyway, 
and more people have no reason for their behaviour (that they know or want to admit) than 
do it for any reason in particular. This shows that perfectly reasonable people, with 
surprising frequency, are not sufficiently motivated by their moral beliefs to act in 
accordance with them. 
Szutta points out that Zagzebski’s assertion, that admiration leads to a desire to 
emulate, is corroborated by experiments such as those by Jonathan Haidt. Haidt found that 
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reactions to witnessing disinterested helping behaviour, heroic actions or acts of 
compassion include a stronger desire to become a better person [Haidt, 2003] and the 
motivation to do good things for other people [Algoe & Haidt, 2009]. This supports the idea 
that exemplars are an effective model for inspiring moral behaviour. However, as Kristjan 
Kristjansson points out, the path from admiration to behaviour may not be direct; we might 
instead admire the exemplar and identify the moral virtue they are exemplifying and then 
aim to emulate them in those aspects [Kristjansson, 2017, pp.20-37]. This is not to say that 
designating someone as a good person worthy of emulation is dependent on descriptive 
concepts, as the identification of the concepts comes after the attribution of moral value. 
The things that we admire about a person make them good, not the fact that they embody 
an abstract concept of the good. This does not contradict Zagzebski’s model, as Kristjansson 
says, but instead shows the value of a knowledge of the Aristotelian virtues, so that agents 
can identify what it is that they are admiring in the exemplar. This can lead to stronger 
emulation of the exemplified virtues, since we can better understand what we are trying to 
emulate and this will likely lead to fewer moral errors. This point, then, shows that a 
synthesis between Aristotle’s theory of the golden mean and Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral 
theory is not just possible but useful to both theories.  
Kristjansson’s argument for a wider exemplarist theory also protects the theory 
against another criticism: that not everything an exemplar does is admirable. There are 
people who do great things, things that it would be good for others to emulate, but who 
occasionally do things that it would be better not to emulate. For example, Mahatma 
Gandhi was a hero of civil rights movements across the world and was one of the key figures 
in securing self-rule in India [Burton, 2010, p.289]. These are parts of his character that it 
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would be good for others to emulate, since they instantiate the virtues of justice and 
compassion. However, Gandhi also acted out “experiments of faith” where he would sleep 
naked with young female members of his own family in order to test his commitment to 
abstinence [Parekh, 1999, pp.210-221]. This is probably something that it would not be right 
to emulate, since it does not correspond well with the virtues. Under the narrow 
interpretation of exemplarist theory one might be able to argue that everything that an 
admirable person does, including the more questionable things, is exemplary by virtue of 
their overall character being admirable. There are also those people who generally do not 
live an admirable life but are influential in a virtuous cause. For example, Madison Grant 
was an American eugenicist who wrote perhaps the ‘most influential work of scientific 
racism in history’, in The Passing of The Great Race, a book that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler 
would later describe as his ‘bible’ [Arnold, 2011, p.227]. Grant was also one of the founders 
of the American conservationist movement, pioneering wildlife management and co-
founding the Save the Redwoods League [Save the Redwoods League, 2020]. Grant was by 
no means a hero, nor was his character as a whole admirable, but some of his actions are 
worthy of admiration and emulation. Using the templates of the golden means that Aristotle 
provided, we can untangle the virtuous characteristics of exemplars from their not so 
virtuous characteristics, and in doing so we can discern what it is that makes us virtuous. 
Without this aspect of Virtue Ethics, the task of cultivating a virtuous character by emulating 
an admirable exemplar becomes much harder.   
These exemplars do not necessarily have to be emulated in their actions, but if the 
process by which they choose to act is virtuous and fruitful then they could be considered a 
good exemplar. For example, an organisation might have an effective system of determining 
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how to efficiently use plastic so that they minimise waste and pollution, and they may still 
use a lot of plastic because their needs dictate that they do. The amount of plastic they use 
in isolation is not worthy of emulation, since the agent wanting to emulate them will have 
different needs no matter how subtle, but, as long as they emulate the process, then they 
are acting in accordance with virtue. It is not using practical wisdom to look at someone who 
is virtuous, see how much plastic they use, and to copy them, using the same amount of 
plastic as them. The practically wise choice is to see how the person evaluated how much 
plastic they need and how best to use it, and to apply that process to their own situation. 
Though the final results will be different and one may use more plastic than the other, both 
the exemplar and the agent would be equally environmentally virtuous. This is important 
because it heads off any misunderstanding about what following an exemplar actually 
entails. Some of the exemplars that I will be discussing may have relationships with the 
environment in general or plastic in particular that seem extreme. However, with the wider 
interpretation of exemplarist theory, we are not committed to copying their actions, but 
emulating, where appropriate, the process of reasoning that led to those actions.  
Another reason this distinction is so important is that it is more likely to lead to a 
virtuous disposition. Virtue Ethics has a focus on the character of agents, rather than the 
morality of their actions taken individually. This means that in order to be virtuous one must 
have a virtuous character, a disposition to act in accordance with virtue. A person who only 
copies the action of an exemplar might develop a disposition to act in accordance with 
virtue in the specific situations that they have seen the exemplar in, but they are unlikely to 
be able to properly apply that to any foreign situations. Copying the exemplar’s actions will 
teach the agent how to appear virtuous, but understanding how the exemplar comes to 
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choose those actions and emulating that process will lead to them developing a virtuous 
disposition more easily, and therefore will more effectively guide them to become virtuous.  
Using the wider interpretation of Zagzebski’s exemplarist virtue theory, 
incorporating a knowledge of the Aristotelian virtues and the concept of the golden mean, 
we can conclude that when searching for environmental exemplars we are searching for 
admirable individuals, communities and organisations who instantiate some form of 
environmental virtue that agents could practically emulate. This solves the problem of 
circularity in identifying exemplars in virtue ethics because it lays out a step-by-step process 
for applying criteria to potential candidates. We identify the possible exemplars without 
reference to the virtues, only by the fact that they are admirable, as a starting point for 
determining who is environmentally virtuous. Then we reflect on what makes them 
admirable and what parts of their character we should try to emulate using practical 
wisdom and the Aristotelean concept of the golden mean. In this, Aristotle’s and Zagzebski’s 
theories combine into an effective framework for identifying environmentally virtuous 
exemplars. Now that we have this framework, we can begin to apply it to possible 
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Chapter 5: Is Rojava an appropriate environmental exemplar? 
So far we have looked at the problems posed by plastic pollution and the potential that the 
exemplar approach has to contribute to solving them. In order to fulfil this potential, we of 
course need to identify exemplars of environmental virtue. This chapter will discuss the first 
candidate for this status, the founding principles behind it and what makes it an appropriate 
exemplar. “Rojava” is the Kurdish word for “the West” and is the commonly accepted name 
for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, an autonomous region in north-
eastern Syria [Lister, 2015, p.154]. It has existed since the Assad regime withdrew its military 
forces from the area in 2012. Faced with the sudden lack of a governing power, Rojava’s 
diverse population [Allsop & van Wilgenburg, 2019, pp.156-163] set themselves the goal of 
building a new society based on the principles of feminism, democratic confederalism and 
environmentalism [Evans, 2020]. The accomplishments of the people of Rojava in striving 
towards this goal mean that Rojava and its people could serve as an exemplar for 
environmental virtue ethics, as it sets an example of a society that connects people to their 
environment and gives them power to preserve it in a way that suits their needs. The origins 
for the Rojavan project can be traced back to American philosopher Murray Bookchin, 
whose communalist philosophy and concept of libertarian municipalism was highly 
influential to Abdullah Öcalan [Saed, 2015, pp.1-15], whose political philosophy would be 
the driving force behind the Rojavan constitution.  
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5.1 Libertarian Municipalism 
The core belief that drives Murray Bookchin’s theory of libertarian municipalism is that the 
way that societies are currently structured keeps people from power, and that our response 
to this should be to try and reorder society ‘so that people gain power’ [Vanek, 2001, 6]. The 
ways that people are distanced from power and the effects that these have are numerous 
and varied, but the most important to Bookchin, and most relevant to this research, are the 
environmental effects. In his interview with David Vanek, Bookchin describes the problem 
with trying to protect the environment in the current political system. He says that those in 
power listen to lobbyists and make promises to protect the environment only insofar as it 
will win them enough votes to get elected. Once they are elected, they only act in the 
interests of the ruling class, and that often means going back on their promises to the 
people. He admits that occasionally they do grant concessions, but it is only a drop in the 
ocean in comparison to the damage they do, saying ‘they’ll give you ten acres of 
“wilderness” but then they’ll cut down the rest of the forest’ [Vanek, 2001, 5]. People are 
distanced from the power they should have over their own environment because all of the 
decisions about how it is treated are being made by people who are only accountable on the 
rare occasion that they are up for re-election, and who have a vested interest in maintaining 
the status quo. The only other checks on the state’s power that are put in place are not 
guaranteed to be in the interests of the people either. For example, in 2019 Labour MP 
Mary Creagh voiced concerns about the UK government’s proposed environmental 
watchdog, the Office for Environmental Protection (OEP), that it would be ‘funded by 
government, monitoring targets set by government and with a chair appointed by 
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government’ [Hodgson, 2019]. This shows that the state cannot always be trusted to hold 
itself to account, and that the people should play this role as much as possible. 
Even in cases where there is oversight of the actions of governments, the structures 
that are responsible for it are not accountable to the people, and as a result, are not 
incentivised to represent the people, so the people are distanced from power. It is 
important to note that Bookchin does not think that this can be changed by changing which 
party is in government, he sees it as an inherent problem with representative democracy, as 
it does not allow enough accountability of those in charge to the people that they represent. 
Some parties will give the people more concessions than others, but the system of 
representative democracy and its inherent lack of accountability incentivises those in power 
to act in their own interest.  
Bookchin argues that the best way for people to gain power is to move from a 
representative democracy to a direct democracy, making decisions on the level of ‘the 
municipality – the city, town and village – where we have the opportunity to create a face-
to-face democracy’ [Vanek, 2001, 6]. This would mean that decisions affecting the local 
population would be made by the local population in the form of public assemblies 
[Bookchin, 2015, p.96], and eventually replacing the state in its current form with a 
government made up of a confederation of free municipalities [Bookchin, 1991, 12]. While 
there would still need to be a certain amount of representative democracy within this 
system, since a government made up of every individual citizen would not be practical, this 
system would empower the individual citizen and local community to a much greater extent 
than the current system. Through this change, we could massively reduce the amount of 
corruption and individualism in politics and, Bookchin believes, direct society towards 
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‘meeting human needs, responding to ecological imperatives, and developing a new ethics 
based on sharing and cooperation’ [Bookchin, 1991, 4]. Bookchin also believed that this 
would have a necessary knock-on effect on the environment, because the way that we as 
humans treat the environment as something that exists only for our convenience is a result 
of our hierarchical view of society [Light, 1998, p.6]. When people take more responsibility 
for the decisions being made in their society and have an equal opportunity to contribute, 
they recognise each other’s right to an equal share in the environment, and the importance 
of respect for its preservation. One could even argue that they are more likely to view 
themselves as a part of nature rather than above it, which evokes the Aristotelean idea of 
the unique human function as part of nature, because they no longer define themselves in a 
hierarchical relationship to other humans but see humanity as a whole, as those that 
represent their communities and make decisions on their behalf only have more power than 
those that they represent in as far as they are the ones who communicate the views of the 
community, their opinions and desires have no more influence than any other member of 
the community. 
Overall, Bookchin proposes libertarian municipalism as a way of empowering people 
practically and politically to take control of protecting their environment, their rights and 
their interests. Bookchin’s goals are admirable because at the core he wants to protect the 
environment from unnecessary harm. He is also doing this in a way that benefits as many 
people as possible and empowers them in ways that are not just to do with the 
environment. These ideas are admirable because they instantiate the virtues of justice and 
empathy, in recognising people’s rights to self-determination and to live in a healthy 
environment. Whether Bookchin can be considered an environmental exemplar will depend 
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on how his ideas are put into practice, since one of the key characteristics of a virtuous 
disposition is that it leads to action, and whether one can practically emulate those who 
practice them. His theory has influenced many thinkers and movements across the world, 
perhaps most significantly in the work of Abdullah Öcalan, the key thinker behind the 
foundation of Rojava. 
 
5.2 Democratic Confederalism 
Abdullah Öcalan is a Kurdish political theorist and founding member of the militant 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), an organisation that was designated as terrorist by the 
United States government in 2001 [Powell, 2001]. The group carried out attacks against 
Turkish government forces as well as civilians throughout the nineteen eighties and 
nineteen nineties in an attempt to create an independent Kurdish State, following the 1980 
Turkish coup d’état. From the early 1990s onwards Öcalan made efforts to pivot the group’s 
strategy from militancy to diplomacy, even declaring unilateral ceasefires in 1993, 1995 and 
1998 [van Bruinessen, 1999, p.5]. From his cell on Imrali, a Turkish island prison, he has 
written several books, primarily focusing on the concept of democratic confederalism, 
which strongly influenced the political structures of Rojava. 
Inspired in part by Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism, Öcalan developed his own 
theory, which he called democratic confederalism, in order to oppose and address the 
problems he saw as inherent in nation-states, which he calls ‘an enemy of the peoples’ 
[Öcalan, 2011, p.13]. He argues that the nation-state is not concerned, as it should be, with 
the fate of the common people, but instead that it is concerned with the interests of 
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capitalists, calling it ‘a colony of capital’. This belief is likely one of the reasons he 
abandoned the cause of Kurdish nationalism in its traditional form, arguing that the creation 
of a Kurdish nation-state would feed into the capitalist structure and leave ‘no place for the 
liberation of the peoples’ [Ibid., p.19]. In the identification of the problem with nation-
states, we can see how Öcalan was influenced by Bookchin, who saw governments as only 
acting in the interest of capital. Öcalan is attempting to practically apply the principles of 
libertarian municipalism to the problem of Kurdish independence and follow them to their 
natural end.  
Öcalan argues that in order to ensure a continuous democratic process [p.22], there 
needs to be ‘a type of political self-administration' where the will of the people can be 
expressed ‘in local meetings, general conventions and councils’. The effects of this, he says, 
will be to allow for the formation of ‘different and diverse political groups’ and in turn the 
advancement of ‘political integration of society as a whole’ [p.26]. Öcalan puts forward five 
principles of democratic confederalism which include that it is based on ‘grass-roots 
participation’ and that its ‘decision-making processes lie with the communities’, as ‘it is the 
only approach that can cope with diverse ethnic groups, religions, and class differences’, 
and that ‘democratic confederalism in Kurdistan is an anti-nationalist movement’ [p,33-34]. 
Through these principles, Öcalan lays out and justifies a decision-making process that will 
lead to virtuous actions in the society that implements them. By using the system that he 
describes, communities have a rational process by which they can work out what resources 
they need, how these resources should be acquired and distributed. While it is not yet clear 
how effective this will be in practice, as there are questions about how community 
participation will happen in reality or be implemented at a government level; in theory 
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democratic confederalism is an effective process for deciding how to act on a community 
level, and one that is more likely to lead to a virtuous community. This is because having this 
process and knowing how to apply it allows the community to develop a disposition towards 
acting in the right way. Following a process means that the society may not have guidance 
on how to act in every individual situation (Öcalan does not propose any specific policies, he 
leaves that up to the councils) but, as long as the process is led by the community and 
remains equal across society, they are able to work out for themselves the virtuous course 
of action.  
This theory is admirable because it is in accordance with the virtues of justice since it 
gives everyone an equal say in how their society is run. Obviously there are a number of 
other factors that make society unequal, such as education, gender and social background, 
which may still factor into whose voices get heard most often; but Öcalan’s model does 
increase equality in theory by increasing the opportunities for everyone in society to have 
their interests reflected in policy. The theory is also admirable because it accords with the 
virtue of responsibility by making everyone responsible for the decisions they make when 
they become their own representatives, rather than handing the responsibility to someone 
else. Consideration for the environment because protections for the environment and 
people’s rights to access it and responsibility to care for it are an integral part of the 
process. However, the theory on its own is not enough to qualify democratic confederalism 
as an environmental exemplar even if it is admirable, it needs to effectively lead to action 
and in doing so become dispositional to those implementing it.  
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5.3 The Rojavan Example 
In order to see whether the culmination of Murray Bookchin’s and Abdullah Öcalan’s 
theories can effectively lead to action and become dispositional we can look at the system 
of government in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. A place that the 
locals call ‘Rojava’, whose politics are now explicitly that of democratic confederalism 
[Simcock, 2018]. Rojava’s political system is comprised of communes made up of between 
seven and one hundred households which come together to form councils of different 
levels, rising all the way to city level, who make decisions based on a blend of consensus and 
voting [Knapp & Jongerden, 2016, p.98]. The communes have public spaces where the 
public can meet to discuss and resolve issues [Ibid., p.100]. In the village of Jinwar, a name 
that combines the Kurdish words meaning “woman” and “place” to describe a village 
exclusively inhabited by women, the residents take turns to be the representative to the 
other towns in the area and the media [Evans, 2020]. This helps the women to develop their 
political voice and applies Öcalan’s theory that a free society would be one where everyone 
takes equal part in the political process. 
There are a few details of how Rojavan politics operates that indicate that it would 
make a good exemplar of environmental virtue. The first being its prioritisation of 
environmental conservation and disposition to protect the environment as much as 
possible. This is exemplified in the fact that, at the same time as fighting both the Islamic 
State in Syria (ISIS), on one side, and having their existence threatened by Turkey, on the 
other, they are building their villages using eco-friendly construction methods with the 
intention that ‘one day [...] villages like this will help reduce the influence, size and 
ecological toll of overcrowded cities’ [Evans, 2020, 41:00-42:00]. This prioritisation of 
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environmental virtue, even in the face of a struggle for survival, shows how deeply ingrained 
the desire to protect the environment is for the people of Rojava. This kind of character is 
necessary for all communities to have if we are to achieve radical change on environmental 
issues. This is another reason why Rojava would make a good environmental exemplar, 
because it is a great example of a society with a disposition to protect the environment as 
much as possible. 
Another factor that makes Rojava an appropriate exemplar of environmental virtue 
is the fact that the people seem disposed to act in the way that they do, rather than acting 
because they are being commanded. These dispositions could of course still originate from 
the internalisation of direct commands, but there is evidence to suggest that in Rojava they 
arise from a genuine belief in the values that Öcalan’s theory reflects. The emphasis of the 
political process having been based on Abdullah Öcalan’s ideas have raised some concerns 
about ideologization, especially since he is so vocally anti-capitalist and anti-nationalist, with 
some scholars arguing that it could ‘obscure whether the people are really acting based on 
democratic values or if they are just following the orders of their leader’ [Barkhoda, 2016, 
p.86]. There is evidence, however, that this is not the case, as Evans observes in The 
Women’s War that ‘a number of the women [in] Jinwar don’t express a great depth of 
knowledge about Abdullah Öcalan’s ideas’, which he sees as a ‘clear statement about the 
relative lack of brainwashing that occurs here’ [Evans, 2020, 40:00-41:00]. This is important 
because, as well as suggesting that Rojava is more than an ideological project based solely 
on carrying out the commands of Abdullah Öcalan, it shows that the way the society runs is 
not by following the tenets of democratic confederalism by rote but according to an 
ingrained sense of the ideas behind it. Evans says that ‘the ideological underpinnings of 
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[Jinwar] are important...but no woman is denied a place to live because they haven’t read 
enough political theory’ [Ibid.]. The people are acting out of a disposition to share power 
and responsibility, make society fair and equal, and protect the environment. This makes 
Rojava a good example of a virtuous society because the people and, by extension, the 
society itself have developed a virtuous character that leads them to act virtuously. This 
strongly suggests that Rojava should be seen as an environmental exemplar. However, while 
it seems that ideologization may not be happening at this moment, it is an important factor 
to consider and protect against in any society that attempts to emulate the Rojavan 
example.  
In an assessment of the relative environmental virtues of Rojava it is important to 
discuss the ways in which it is not environmentally friendly. In doing so I hope to show why 
these less admirable characteristics should not be given too much weight in evaluating the 
region’s suitability as an exemplar. One way in which Rojava is not environmentally friendly 
is that one of its main industries is the production of oil, of which it produces fifteen 
thousand barrels per day [Enzinna, 2015]. It uses this oil for two main purposes: to provide 
electrical power to its people and in its fight against ISIS [Colella, 2016]. Everything that the 
region does not use it exports, mainly to Syria, for a substantial source of its revenue. This 
practice somewhat contradicts Rojava’s foundational commitment to ecological 
sustainability [van Wilgenburg, 2016]. The environmental crisis that we are facing means 
that, now more than ever, we should be turning away from fossil fuels as sources of power 
and income and towards more sustainable methods. Applying Hursthouse’s principle of 
right action that Sandler claims is the standard for ‘contemporary virtue-oriented principles 
of right action’ [Sandler, 2007] this action would not seem right because it is not ‘what a 
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virtuous agent would do in the circumstances’ [Hursthouse, 1991, p.225]. The virtuous 
agent being the person who has a completely virtuous character, rather than an exemplar, 
who exemplifies an aspect of virtue but not necessarily all of the virtues. It could therefore 
be argued that Rojava is not an appropriate environmental exemplar. 
However, the circumstances are important and do factor into the standard 
Hursthouse sets for a reason, and one of the circumstances in this case is that Rojava is 
currently at war with ISIS. Fighting this war takes a huge amount of money and resources. In 
2014, the autonomous administration spent fifty percent of its annual revenue, almost 
three million US dollars, on ‘self-defence and protection’ [Rashid, 2018]. Rojava has chosen 
to prioritise its continued existence over converting their infrastructure and economy to run 
on renewable energy under these specific circumstances. There is also the fact that the 
main importer of their oil is Syria, a key ally in the fight against ISIS and therefore a country 
with which the autonomous administration needs to maintain a positive relationship. 
Considering these factors, it seems that their decision to produce, use and sell oil is actually 
what a virtuous person would do under the circumstances, or at the very least it should not 
count against them when measuring their suitability as an environmental exemplar. 
Another factor to consider when assessing Rojava’s use of oil and other fossil fuels is 
that it is not necessarily the actions that we are suggesting people emulate when we 
designate them as an environmental exemplar. As previously explained, it is not the 
outcomes of an exemplar’s reasoning process that should be admirable or exemplary, but 
the reasoning process itself. This is because learning how to apply the process is more in 
accordance with the dispositional aspects of virtue ethics than simply copying their actions 
uncritically. In this case Rojava produces, uses and exports oil, which is bad for the 
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environment. However, they have applied a process of deliberation in councils at the 
community level where everyone has equal representation in accordance with the 
constitution, taking into account the environment and the rights of peoples in order to work 
out that they need to use that oil. Another society that applies a similar process under 
different circumstances, perhaps one that is not fighting a war for its very survival or is able 
to easily sustain itself on renewable energy, will end up using less oil. It is the reasoning 
process that the exemplars employ, which results naturally from their core beliefs, that 
should be emulated, meaning it is not necessarily true that Rojava’s use of oil and other 
fossil fuels should disqualify it from being considered an environmental exemplar. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
It can be concluded from this discussion that the application of Murray Bookchin’s green 
philosophy and Abdullah Öcalan’s political theory in Rojava make the region and its people 
an appropriate exemplar of environmental virtue ethics. Bookchin accurately describes the 
ways in which people are distanced from power and the negative effects this has on them 
and the environment. His solution to the problem in the form of libertarian municipalism 
would ensure, in theory, that the people share responsibility and have direct access to 
power through a system of councils and public assemblies. This system is admirable 
because, as we have seen, it allows communities to maintain their environment and ensures 
that no one person is given the power to act in their own interests against the interests of 
the community with regards to the environment. The admirable aspects of libertarian 
municipalism are also in accordance with virtue as they instantiate the Aristotelean golden 
means of justice, environmental responsibility and empathy among others. Libertarian 
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municipalism is therefore virtuous in theory, but in order to justify its status as an 
appropriate environmental exemplar it needs to be effectively put into practice. 
Abdullah Öcalan’s theory of democratic confederalism describes the problems 
inherent in nation-states and how vested interests work against the cause of 
environmentalism. He argues how a system of self-administration in the form of local 
meetings and councils is the best way to ensure that everyone is engaged in politics. Öcalan 
lays out a set of principles that define how such a system could work were anyone to get the 
chance to implement it, as we have seen in Rojava. Like libertarian municipalism, 
democratic confederalism is admirable because it is in accordance with the virtues of 
justice, environmental responsibility and empathy; and it is also admirable because of the 
specific circumstances of its creator. Öcalan’s endorsement of and involvement in what 
have been called terrorist activities for the cause of Kurdish nationalism cannot be ignored; 
however, his subsequent condemnation of nationalist violence is also important to consider. 
What makes his theory admirable in these circumstances is that he writes into the very 
principles of democratic confederalism that people of all nationalities, races and religions be 
actively included in all aspects of the political process. Unlike nation-states, to be a part of a 
society that follows democratic confederalism one does not need to define oneself by a 
national identity (to take part in British politics in even the most basic sense of voting for 
your MP you have to be a British citizen). This is admirable because it breaks down the 
barriers that prevent people from taking part in politics, if you exist in Rojava, you have as 
much of a right to political participation as anyone else. It also ensures that there is no 
justification for any administration claiming to be inspired by Öcalan to ignore the rights of 
any person no matter who they are.  
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The culmination of Bookchin’s and Öcalan’s work successfully leads to virtuous 
action in to form of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Through its 
system of councils and public assemblies, Rojava restores power to its people by engaging 
them in direct face-to-face democracy. This achieves Bookchin’s goal of ensuring that 
people gain power, and the people of Rojava use that power to empower women, fight the 
threat of ISIS and, most relevantly to this research, act in accordance with environmental 
virtue. While there are valid concerns about their reliance on fossil fuels, the process that 
they use to decide what actions they should take is what is important in our approach 
because, as previously discussed, we are following the wider interpretation of Zagzebski’s 
exemplarist virtue theory. The process that is used in Rojava is one that is in accordance 
with Aristotle’s virtue ethics as it employs practical wisdom in order to arrive at their golden 
mean of environmental virtue. It can therefore be concluded that Rojava is an appropriate 
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Chapter 6: Indigenous Populations as Exemplars 
We have seen in the previous chapter that there are exemplars of how a political system can 
achieve environmental virtue, but if we are to solve the plastic pollution crisis, we also need 
to be virtuous on the level of the individual and the community. It therefore makes sense to 
assess the suitability of communities who have a long-established reputation of 
environmental responsibility – indigenous people. Native Americans and aboriginal people 
have many things in common by virtue of the fact that both had their established way of life 
threatened by colonisation and exploitation by European settlers, resulting in the continued 
sustainable use and preservation of land being well-established critical issues. In this 
chapter it will be shown that both Native American communities and aboriginal people are 
appropriate environmental exemplars, due to the fact that they both have deeply 
established holistic attitudes towards the environment that result in them having developed 
virtuous characters. This character motivates them to treat sustainability as the most 
important goal in interactions with the land. It will also be argued that, despite some valid 
concerns, we can emulate aspects of their characters in order to cultivate our own virtuous 
dispositions towards the environment. In the first chapter I will discuss Native American 
attitudes to the environment, what makes them admirable, and to what extent we can 
emulate them, including the land ethic and a functional view of ecosystems. I will then go on 
in the second section to look at the ways in which Australian aboriginal people interact with 
the environment, including sustainable development and a dynamic relationship with 
natural resources. I will discuss the characteristics that make aboriginal people appropriate 
exemplars of environmental virtue and refute some of the arguments that they are more 
environmentally destructive than conservationist. Finally, I will look at some suggestions of 
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how we can best emulate aboriginal attitudes to the environment through cultural and 
ecological education.  
 
6.1 Native American Communities 
Native American communities are often seen as being ‘close to nature’ or ‘at one with the 
land’, a view that is shared by members of the communities and non-members alike [Booth, 
2003, pp. 330-331]. In light of this view, it is useful to look at what Native American 
communities’ attitudes towards the environment are, what is admirable about them and 
whether they are environmentally virtuous. Through answering these questions, it will be 
shown that Native American communities would make appropriate exemplars in 
environmental virtue ethics. This is due to the land ethic that they have developed over 
successive generations, based on a functional view of environments. Despite some 
objections based on the extent to which Native American culture can be emulated and the 
occasional mistreatment of Native American land, it will be argued that the dispositional 
attitudes towards the environment can be effectively emulated and would result in the 
cultivation of an environmentally virtuous character. 
A study of Native American attitudes towards the environment can help to broaden 
our own view and, in doing so, change our dispositions towards the environment in a 
positive way. In her 2014 book Native American Environmentalism, Joy Porter puts forward 
a view that our current dispositions towards the environment are flawed in that they ignore 
the way that we have historically abused the environment and alienated certain people 
from their rights to access nature, arguing that our modern society frames our relationship 
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in a way that ‘denies colonialism, separates man as a species from nature, and reiterates all 
the tropes [of] the early American 19th century’ [Porter, 2014, p.133]. This highlights the 
need for a study of Native American environmentalism in order to counter such uncritical 
understandings [Hamilton, 2014, p.713] and particularly to show how different 
understandings of our relationship to the environment arise and what can be learned from 
them. Engaging with environmentalism in a way that takes colonialism and our place in the 
ecosystem into account is key to changing how we treat the environment. This is a change 
that will hopefully help us to resolve the climate crisis that we are currently experiencing.  
There are however a few issues with studying Native American attitudes towards the 
environment, some of which are external and some of which are internal. Firstly, there is 
the stereotypical perception of ‘Native Americans as “natural” environmentalists and 
adherents to a simple nature-based spirituality’ [Hamilton, 2014, p.712]. This is a very 
simplistic view of Native American culture which works against the goal of designating them 
as environmental exemplars, since it pins all of their attitudes to their identity as Native 
Americans alone and excludes everyone else because this identity is not available to non-
Indians. It also somewhat dismisses the philosophy and history that actually supports their 
beliefs as something that naturally occurs from the fact that they are Native American, and 
not from a complex and justified philosophy of environment. By examining this philosophy 
and history, and understanding more fully their attitudes and dispositions towards the 
environment, we can determine whether Native American communities are appropriate 
environmental exemplars. 
Secondly, a more internal issue that needs to be considered while studying Native 
American attitudes to the environment is that there is knowledge about their culture that is 
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not available to non-Indians. Porter illustrates this point by quoting Cherokee sculptor and 
writer Jimmie Durham, who said in an interview ‘what I want them to know is that they 
can’t know that’ [Porter, 2014, p.82]. The problem that this presents to our investigation 
into possible environmental exemplars is that a limit to the knowledge we can gain about an 
exemplar results in a limit to how well they can be emulated, which will in turn make them a 
less appropriate exemplar. However, this may not be too significant an issue if it is cultural 
knowledge that is protected, since this is personal to agents of every culture, and anyone 
emulating an exemplar will need to take their own culture into account in any case. By 
examining the knowledge that we have access to and why we cannot have access to that 
which we do not, we can determine the extent to which Native American communities can 
be emulated and how this affects their suitability as exemplars in environmental virtue 
ethics.  
It is becoming increasingly clear that the climate crisis currently presents the biggest 
issue humanity has to solve, and the problem of plastic pollution is arguably the biggest 
component of the crisis. Although this fact may be new to most modern societies, for Native 
American communities it has long been the case that the treatment of land, its sustainable 
use, loss and exploitation are defining issues [Lewis, 1995, p.424]. Native American 
communities have tended to take a functional view of ecosystems that, in contrast to more 
capitalistic societies, views sustainability as the ultimate objective. In “Native Americans and 
the Environment”, David Rich Lewis opposes the stereotypical views that he says ‘depicted 
Indians as beings without action or agency, who left no marks on the land, who lived within 
the strictest of natural constraints’ [p.439]. He argues that these stereotypes were harmful 
because they ‘denied Native Americans their humanity, culture, history and most 
importantly, their modernity’ [Cornell, 1985, pp.104-117]. This stereotype also works 
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against their perceived appropriateness as environmental exemplars because it sets too 
strong a standard of environmental virtue. Presenting an example of a society that has 
absolutely no environmental impact and expecting everyone to emulate it is completely 
unrealistic, especially when even the exemplars are not living up to the stereotype, and it 
would result in people’s moral motivation reducing massively. Having a realistic view of 
Native American environmentalism, as Lewis advocates, will have the effect of showing that 
our attitudes towards the environment are actually more compatible with theirs than the 
stereotypes would have one believe. Lewis argues that ‘Indians were never properly 
“ecologists” [but] careful students of their functional environments, bound by material and 
cultural needs and constraints, striving for maximum sustained yield rather than maximum 
production’ [p.439]. This is different enough to our current attitude to the environment, one 
where we exploit its resources to get as much out of it as we can, that emulating it can have 
a positive effect on the environment. However, it is not too radically different as to be seen 
as unattainable. In this way, Lewis’s view of Native American environmentalism, as being 
based around functional environments, supports their appropriateness as exemplars in 
environmental virtue ethics. 
 Native American attitudes towards the environment are admirable because they 
instantiate the Aristotelean concept of eudaimonia and because their society has cultivated 
environmentally virtuous characters in its members. Lewis observes that Native American 
communities developed a ‘land ethic based on long-term experience’ [Lewis, 1995, p.439], 
which suggests that their actions are character-driven, based on a social disposition that has 
developed over successive generations. This means that their ethic is already compatible 
with environmental virtue ethics, which is concerned with the cultivation of a virtuous 
character above all else. Lewis says that this land ethic grew out of a view of the world with 
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all of its inhabitants ‘as an interrelated whole’ and the fact that ‘they were part of creation’ 
[Ibid.]. The Native American view that Lewis observes is therefore in accordance with 
environmental virtue. This also makes Native American communities admirable because 
they are not driven by the personal gain that comes from exploiting the environment for its 
maximum yield, and instead prioritise conserving the ecosystem for its other members and 
for future generations. These aspects of their land ethic make a good case for viewing 
Native American communities as exemplars of environmental virtue.  
 One argument against Native American communities being appropriate 
environmental exemplars comes from a lack of access to knowledge about how the 
communities work. Rosalind Hursthouse argues that they may not make appropriate 
exemplars because we only have ‘glimpses’ of what life may have been like for them, and 
that even if we knew everything about them and knew that they were virtuous, it does not 
necessarily mean that we should strive to be like them [Husthouse, 2007, p.155-171]. It may 
be true that there is no way a non-Indian can get a full picture of what it is like to live as a 
Native American, but there are ways in which we can build a sufficient picture of what 
Native American life is like to be able to emulate them. It is also true that Native American 
communities are too varied for there to be a singular comprehensive account of their 
culture distilled into one character, however, we have seen that there are shared 
characteristics that can inform environmental virtue ethics in a significant way. The criticism 
that we should not necessarily adopt their way of life has already been accounted for by our 
focus on Kristjánsson’s wider interpretation of Zagzebski’s exemplarist virtue theory 
[Kristjánsson, 2017, p.20-37]. This interpretation allows us to focus on the character of the 
exemplar and the process that leads them to environmentally virtuous action, in order that 
we can emulate the exemplar in a way that is appropriate to the needs of our own 
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situations. This means the examples set by Native American communities can inspire 
virtuous actions in other communities, by applying the same reasoning processes and 
cultivating a virtuous character. 
Perhaps a better reason why Native American communities may not be appropriate 
environmental exemplars is that there are examples of communities acting in ways that are 
not environmentally responsible. There are many reservations that have sold the rights to 
extract fossil fuels and dump toxic waste on their land to private companies and United 
States authorities, resulting in ‘an estimated 1200 hazardous waste sites [being] located on 
or adjacent to reservations nationally’ [Lewis, 1995, p. 433]. These situations seem to 
suggest that Native American communities do not always act in accordance with the land 
ethic that we have seen is virtuous. However, this is not a black and white issue, there is a 
long history of the United States government exploiting Native American land for natural 
resources and perceived emptiness. Although their rights are now, in theory, more 
protected than they were in the nineteenth century, the pressure from outside forces still 
exists and has a huge effect [Suagee, 1982, p. 1-49]. This external exploitation from the 
fossil fuel industry and others accounts for much of the environmental damage that occurs 
on Native American reservations. This links back to the discussion in chapter 3, where it was 
argued that the capitalist system is inherently damaging to the environment because of its 
prioritisation of profit over the social good. Native American land ethics’ rejection of this 
principle in favour of targeting a sustainable yield shows a rejection of the free market 
economics that led to environmental destruction in the first place. There are examples of 
Native American communities acting in ways that are antithetical to environmental virtue. 
The mitigating circumstances of ongoing exploitation exacerbated by a need to interact with 
a capitalist system suggests that these actions do not result from the dispositional land ethic 
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that most communities embody. The exploitation of Native American land by external 
agents actually highlights the contrast in ethics between the environmentally virtuous 
Native American communities and the exploitative free market capitalist system. This shows 
how important it is that we try to emulate the attitudes that many Native American 
communities have towards the environment.  
While much of the blame for the environmental destruction that occurs on Native 
American land can be placed on external forces, it is also important to highlight the ways in 
which the inhabitants of those reservations are also complicit. The Navajo nation in Utah, 
for example, received at least sixty million US dollars from oil companies in the years up to 
1995 [Lewis, 1995, p.431], meaning that Native Americans have profited at least slightly off 
of the destruction of the environment. However, the relative poverty that the majority of 
Utah Navajo members live in and the fact that ‘little has trickled down’ to the average 
resident suggests that it is not the majority of Native Americans that have benefited. There 
is a certain amount of corruption amongst the leaders of communities that allow fossil fuel 
extraction on their reservations. This inference is supported by the fact that the majority of 
members of the Utah Navajo nation are against allowing companies to drill for oil on their 
land and are attempting to stop it [Trimble, 2005, pp.162, 182-183]. The majority position 
among the Navajo seems to be in line with the environmentally virtuous character that has 
developed over generations. For these reasons, the environmental destruction that is 
perpetrated by or with the knowledge of Native American people on reservations should be 
acknowledged when assessing their environmental virtue, but does not make Native 
American communities inappropriate environmental exemplars as it does not reflect the 
wider attitude towards the environment that is shared by most communities and members. 
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The Native American attitude towards the environment has been shown to be an 
appropriate exemplar of environmental virtue. A holistic view of ecosystems that 
acknowledges our place as just one part of an interconnected system invokes the 
Aristotelean view of virtue and human flourishing, and leads members of the Native 
American community to develop dispositions to treat the environment with respect. The 
land ethic shows the contrast between Native American and capitalistic attitudes, and offers 
a more virtuous way of interacting with the land. The access that we have to knowledge 
about Native American culture is enough for us to know that a society that emulates their 
attitudes to the environment would be more environmentally virtuous for it. It is for these 
reasons that we can conclude that Native American communities are an appropriate 
exemplar in environmental virtue ethics.  
 
6.2 Aboriginal People 
Like Native American communities, there are a number of stereotypes that surround 
Aboriginal attitudes to and relationships with the environment, including the idea that they 
are more a part of nature than, and therefore inferior to, non-aboriginals. This perhaps 
stems from a misunderstanding of the fact that aboriginal people ‘largely resist the western 
categorical distinction between “human”, on the one hand, and “non-human” on the other’ 
[Ryan, 2015]. For many years the accepted view that many non-aboriginals held could be 
summed up by naturalist Robert Pulleine’s description of them as ‘an unchanging people, 
living in an unchanging environment’ [Pulleine, 1928, p.310]. Over the last century however, 
this view has been challenged many times by those who put forward more dynamic 
accounts of aboriginal history. One such account is put forward by Rhys Jones, whose “Fire 
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Stick Farming” hypothesis argues that Aboriginal populations are not environmentally 
sustainable, and damaged the environment through their liberal use of fire as a tool for 
farming, clearing land and recreation [Jones, 2012, p.4-7]. He describes the continent as 
being ‘colonised, exploited, and moulded’ by Australian Aboriginal people for tens of 
thousands of years [p.3]. This view is supported by Timothy Flannery, who argues that 
aboriginal burning practices were used to make the land more productive after most of 
Australia’s large herbivores had been hunted to extinction [Flannery, 1994]. According to 
this view, Aboriginal people cannot provide guidance for how we should treat the 
environment because they have a history of exploiting it in similar ways to those we have 
seen throughout European history. This would in turn mean that they are not appropriate 
exemplars for environmental virtue ethics, as emulating their practices would not improve 
the way that we treat the environment or help us solve the climate crisis.  
 However, there are those who disagree with Jones’s view of aboriginal history, and 
with good reason. James L. Kohen puts forward a more comprehensive view in his 1995 
book Aboriginal Environmental Impacts, which falls somewhere between the two previously 
discussed ideas that Aboriginal people have had no effect on the environment and that they 
have had a huge negative effect. He instead asserts that ‘there was a dynamic relationship 
between aboriginal people, their technology, the flora and the fauna’ and that this resulted 
in them impacting the Australian environment ‘in a number of ways, but without causing 
any of the large-scale land degradation which typifies more recent European land-
management practices’ [Kohen, 2003, p.ix]. Kohen argues that aboriginal people’s method 
of supporting their population ‘was based on the concept of sustainable development, the 
ability to regenerate resources so they would be available for future generations’, and that 
this was a method that grew out of, and is therefore consistent with, ‘their spiritual and 
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religious beliefs’ [p.ix]. ]. If this view is true then aboriginal people’s attitudes towards the 
environment are admirable, because they are more sustainable and result in less 
environmental damage than most non-aboriginal attitudes. Kohen criticises the theories put 
forward by Jones and Flannery for being too narrow in the time period on which they focus, 
arguing that ‘aboriginal technology was not static over the fifty thousand years of 
occupation’ and that ‘the technology changed, particularly during the last five thousand 
years’ [p.viii]. The idea that their view of the world is reinforced by their spiritual and 
religious belief suggests that this attitude is dispositional, and that those who hold this 
attitude have cultivated an environmentally virtuous character. This would, in turn, make 
aboriginal people good exemplars for environmental virtue ethics, because by emulating 
their approach to environmental issues we could cultivate an environmentally virtuous 
character.  
 Kohen uses historical evidence to support his theory that aboriginal people have and 
have had a dynamic relationship with the environment, first by suggesting that when they 
originally colonised Australia from neighbouring islands, the flora and fauna would have 
been similar enough to that to which they were accustomed that ‘there may have been few 
problems in simply transposing their culture’ [p.25]. This contradicts Jones’s view that 
aboriginal people began moulding the environment to their needs from the moment they 
arrived, but as it is based on some assumptions about what the ecosystem would have been 
like at the time, we cannot say that it disproves it. He points to evidence found on Tasmania 
of populations present within the last twelve thousand years that ‘provides some insight 
into the strategies which were adopted on the mainland to cope with changing climate – 
abandonment of some areas during difficult times, and reoccupation and technological 
specialisation during favourable periods’ [p.29]. While the main reason for these strategies 
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was likely basic survival, it also shows how the dynamic view of aboriginal people developed 
into a disposition to change how the population interacts with the land based on how 
sustainably it can be exploited.  
 In response to accusations by Jones that successive generations of aboriginal people 
used fire liberally to exploit and mould the land as they saw fit, Kohen argues that ‘what 
aboriginal people were trying to achieve was a balance between the need to burn some 
areas to promote certain resources, and the need to protect other areas where particular 
plants grew’ and therefore maximising the productivity of an area [p.40]. This is consistent 
with the evidence that Jones cites, which is mostly based on eye-witness accounts from the 
eighteenth century onwards [Jones, 2012], but not with his conclusion that this practice 
stretches back all the way through their fifty-thousand-year history. Kohen argues that 
aboriginal people contributed little to the process of burning land until the late Holocene 
period, and that even then it was on a local scale in a way that promotes the diversity of the 
ecosystems [Kohen, 2003, p.40]. This is supported by research by Bird et. al. which finds that 
‘anthropogenic burning increases biodiversity and prevents habitat loss at the local scale […] 
but the benefits of burning decline as habitat diversity increases’ [Bird, et. al., 2008, 
p.14799]. Looking at evidence of fires that have occurred in Australia, they found that the 
kind of burning associated with aboriginal people ‘does not eliminate mature habitat, but 
rather prevents its localised extinction from large-scale fires’ [Ibid.]. This suggests that the 
burning carried out by aboriginal people actually helps the environment rather than 
destroys it, meaning they do have a sustainable relationship with the environment. The 
researchers concluded that their results ‘cast doubt on [Jones’s] hypothesis but support the 
notion that the maintenance of biodiversity in the Western Desert relies on [aboriginal] 
hunting [using burning]’ [p.14800]. The fact that aboriginal people have an acknowledged 
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symbiotic relationship with their environment contributes to their virtuous character 
because it reflects the Aristotelean concept of eudaimonia being achieved by flourishing in 
one’s role in the ecosystem. This makes them a good candidate for the status of 
environmental exemplars because, by emulating their attitudes to the environment, we 
have a better chance of achieving eudaimonia.  
 As we have seen, it is not just the fact that they are environmentally virtuous that 
makes exemplars appropriate, we have to be able to emulate their characters by applying 
their decision-making processes to our own situations. It is therefore necessary that there is 
scenario in which their circumstances are applicable to our own so that it makes sense for 
us to ask ourselves “what would an aboriginal person do in my situation?”. Philosopher 
Mary Graham puts forward some strategies for emulating what she calls the ‘collective 
spiritual identity’ that is found in aboriginal communities in her 2008 article “Some Thoughts 
about the Philosophical Underpinnings of Aboriginal Worldviews”. The first of these is 
including programmes within the education system that cultivate this identity by repeated 
positive interactions with nature and the environment [Graham, 2008]. This can be 
combined with another suggested strategy of teaching children how to think in terms of the 
collective and ‘how we as a group act and experience events’ to develop these attitudes 
from an early age with the intended result that ‘the process becomes habitual’. These 
strategies are a good example of how the aboriginal attitude to environment can be 
emulated in ways that ensure agents develop environmentally virtuous characters through 
cultivating dispositions to act as the exemplars do.  
 In conclusion, Aboriginal people can be said to be appropriate exemplars for 
environmental virtue ethics because of the dynamic attitude they have towards the 
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environment, underpinned by a fundamental acknowledgement of their place within nature 
as opposed to above it. We have seen that this attitude results in the sustainable treatment 
of the ecosystems they occupy in a way that promotes biodiversity and approaches human 
flourishing as being dependent on the flourishing of the ecosystem as a whole.   
 
6.3 Conclusion 
It is clear that, when we move past simplistic stereotypes about indigenous people and how 
they interact with the environment, there are common themes between Native American 
and Aboriginal peoples’ attitudes towards environmental issues. These themes include an 
acknowledgement that humans make up only one small part of a vast ecological web that 
includes all living and non-living things in the environment, an idea that is passed down 
through generations and forms a fundamental part of the character of both cultures. They 
also both include a functional view of the environment, where sustainability is prioritised 
over the exploitation of resources for the benefit of individual humans alone. We have also 
seen those views in other cultures, and would likely result in the development of an 
environmentally virtuous character in those who emulate them. It is therefore safe to 
conclude that both Native American communities and Aboriginal people are appropriate 
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Chapter 7: Corporate Virtue, can businesses be considered environmentally virtuous 
exemplars? 
We have so far looked at an exemplar of how an environmentally virtuous political system 
might be organised in the form of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, 
and an exemplar of how personal relationships with the environment can be virtuous in the 
form of Native American and aboriginal communities. In this chapter I will examine another 
of the key ways in which humans interact with the environment, through businesses. 
Looking at the way that we interact with the environment from the perspective of 
businesses is important considering the extent to which companies negatively affect the 
environment. A 2017 report into the responsibility of corporations for industrial carbon 
dioxide and methane emissions highlighted that ‘over half of global industrial emissions 
since human-induced climate change was officially recognised can be traced to just twenty-
five corporate and state producing entities’, eleven of which are privately owned companies 
[Griffin, 2017, p.8]. This is evidence that businesses are largely responsible for the 
environmental crisis, and therefore need to address the ways in which they treat the 
environment. While political and individual environmental virtues do affect businesses in 
some ways, it is necessary to look at possible environmental exemplars in the business 
world to gain some insight into what an environmentally virtuous business is like. In 
assessing these possible exemplars, the questions of what is admirable about them and 
what about the way that they assess their relationship with the environment should be 
emulated by other businesses that want to develop a virtuous character, should be 
answered.  
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7.1 The Body Shop 
The Body Shop is a British cosmetics company that was founded in 1976 by the 
businesswoman and environmentalist Anita Roddick. Since its founding the company has 
tried to cultivate an environmentally friendly image. Early customers were encouraged to 
recycle the packaging of their products and the company emphasised that their products 
were naturally sourced at every opportunity [Chesters, 2011]. In subsequent years The Body 
Shop has been involved in several campaigns directed towards environmental issues, the 
latest of which is a partnership with Plastics For Change, a for-profit organisation that 
proposes business-based solutions to plastic pollution and global poverty. It will be argued 
that The Body Shop sets a good example of an environmentally virtuous company due to the 
fact that its campaigns are admirable and its approach to business has seen it develop a 
virtuous character.  
 The Body Shop’s Community Trade Programme was its first attempt to engage in fair 
trade directly with the communities that produce its products. It also answers a common 
dilemma that businesses are faced with, which is that of how to balance environmental 
sustainability while still making a profit. Many businesses are reluctant to commit to being 
more environmentally virtuous due to a number of reasons, the most significant of which is 
that it does not fit neatly into the way that most businesses currently view investment. Most 
projects that businesses undertake work on short-term returns on investments, and the 
payback period for sustainability investments often exceeds that required to approve 
projects [Laughland and Bansal, 2011]. This means that environmentally virtuous actions are 
often viewed as one-off actions rather than a recurring characteristic of the business model 
[Ibid.]. Therefore, even if the businesses that think in this way do act sustainably on 
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occasion it will not result in them developing a virtuous character, because their sustainable 
actions are one-off and will not be repeated often enough to form a disposition towards 
environmental virtue. The Body Shop’s Community Trade Programme provides an example 
of how environmental sustainability projects can be incorporated into more longer-term 
investments by connecting them to their everyday business, and thus build a disposition to 
act environmentally virtuously.  
 As previously mentioned, the latest iteration of The Body Shop’s Community Trade 
Programme comes in the form of a partnership with Plastics for Change. It aims to tackle the 
twin problems of poverty and plastic pollution in coastal India by employing local ‘waste-
pickers’ to collect plastic waste before it gets into the sea and causes devastation in marine 
ecosystems [Plastics for change | Packaging | The Body Shop, 2020]. This campaign is an 
attempt to help the 1.5 million Indian people who clean up almost a third of the uncollected 
waste in India [TerraGreen, 2019, p.41]. The plastic that is collected by the waste-pickers 
that The Body Shop employs is then used in the manufacturing of their packaging. This 
project solves the dilemma of choosing between sustainability and profitability, because 
they would have had to pay for the plastic that they need for packaging anyway. This switch 
to recycled plastic has meant that they can get what plastic they need and be sustainable at 
the same time without having to commit to a long-term investment or a one-off project 
with no long-term future.  
 The Body Shop’s Community Trade Programme is admirable because it is an effective 
way of causing real change, both environmentally by reducing the amount of plastic 
pollution that gets into the planet’s oceans, and socially by bettering the lives of the urban 
poor in India, who are one of the communities more likely than others to feel the worst 
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effects of the climate crisis [Smith et al, 2007, p.791]. The Body Shop is virtuous because it is 
applying practical reasoning to the problem of plastic pollution in examining its role in 
society and working out what its needs are in terms of sustainable plastic use. Any company 
that emulates The Body Shop’s approach to sustainability is more likely to develop a 
virtuous character due to the fact that its commitment to environmental virtue manifests, 
not just in a series of individual projects, but as a driving principle of their business model; 
and as such it affects everything they do. This is a compelling argument for The Body Shop’s 
being an appropriate exemplar in Environmental Virtue Ethics.   
 Another factor that makes The Body Shop an appropriate exemplar is its 
commitment to reducing its environmental footprint by giving its products a score based on 
their biodegradability. One of the biggest problems that consumers are faced with when 
trying to be environmentally virtuous is that they do not have access to the information 
required to decide which products are the most environmentally friendly, and so cannot 
answer the question of “what would an environmentally virtuous person buy in this 
situation”. The Body Shop helps to solve this problem to a certain extent, but to properly do 
so requires other businesses to follow its example. The Body Shop’s environmental score 
indicates how easily the products break down enough to be safely assimilated into the 
natural process - their biodegradability. This is determined by measuring the amount of 
organic material degraded by microorganisms in 28 days for each individual ingredient and 
combining all of these ingredients to give a final score for each product [Environmental 
Footprint | Reduce Impact | The Body Shop®, 2020]. This is an efficient way of internally 
measuring the environmental sustainability of a business, since it sets a goal of improving all 
of its product scores as much as possible. This is admirable because it goes beyond what 
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many companies do when they make vague claims about sustainability without showing 
how they achieve it or committing to improving themselves in a measurable way. 
 The problem with The Body Shop’s environmental scoring system is that it is the only 
company that uses it, so there is no way of comparing within the market. The consumer can 
see, for example, that ‘in 2017, the total environmental score of all [The Body Shop’s] 
products increased by more than 5%’ [Ibid.], and this is positive because it shows the 
company’s commitment to reducing its environmental footprint and allows its customers to 
hold it to account. Despite this, the consumer cannot see whether or not The Body Shop’s 
products are more environmentally sustainable than Lush, another British cosmetics 
company that is committed to environmental sustainability and using recycled materials in 
its packaging [Our environmental policy, 2020], because they measure their sustainability in 
different ways. This is a problem for consumers who want to buy the most environmentally 
friendly products, as there is no industry-wide standard measurement of how 
environmentally friendly companies are. However, this is more of a problem with the 
cosmetics industry as a whole rather than The Body Shop in particular. This is an example of 
the impact that an exemplar approach to environmental virtue ethics can have on 
businesses. If we take The Body Shop to be an exemplar of environmental virtue then one of 
the things other businesses could emulate would be the way that they score the 
biodegradability of their products. Having an industry-wide standard measurement would 
encourage businesses to compete to be the most sustainable, instil a disposition to act in 
the most environmentally friendly way, and therefore develop a virtuous character. It would 
also have the effect of helping consumers to make the most environmentally virtuous 
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choices because having access to the information would habituate them to consider the 
sustainability of the products that they buy.  
 Overall, The Body Shop is an appropriate exemplar of environmental virtue because 
of its continued commitment to environmental causes including reducing plastic pollution. 
What makes this commitment virtuous is the fact that it goes deeper than one-off projects 
or publicity stunts, and is embedded within the core ethos of the business. Its partnership 
with Plastics for Change shows that this ethos leads to effective action to reduce plastic 
pollution, showing that The Body Shop has cultivated an environmentally virtuous 
disposition. Finally, its biodegradability scoring system provides a great example to 
companies who ask “what would a virtuous business do in response to the crisis of plastic 
pollution?”, a question that all businesses should currently be asking. All of these factors 
contribute to the conclusion that The Body Shop is an exemplar to other businesses of what 
an environmentally virtuous business is like.  
 
7.2 UK Supermarkets 
When looking at businesses’ relationship with plastic pollution, it is impossible to ignore the 
responsibility that supermarkets have for contributing to the plastic pollution crisis in the 
first place. It is therefore necessary that we assess what UK supermarkets are doing to 
combat the crisis, and see if any of them are doing enough to be considered an exemplar in 
environmental virtue ethics. It will be argued that no UK supermarket is an appropriate 
environmental exemplar due to the lack of meaningful action on plastic pollution. Certain 
companies are trying and may prove to be exemplary in the future, of which Waitrose has 
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the most promise. Nevertheless, at this time no one company is doing enough to serve as an 
example that other supermarkets could emulate in order to cultivate an environmentally 
virtuous disposition.  
 Supermarkets have significant responsibility for the current plastic pollution crisis, as 
we now pick up a third of the plastic that we use in our lifetimes from supermarket shelves 
[Fearnley-Wittingstall, 2019] and according to Greenpeace UK and the Environmental 
Investigation Agency they are now putting nine-hundred-thousand tonnes of plastic 
packaging on their shelves every year [Lewis, 2019]. The amount of plastic that they use has 
earned UK supermarkets a lot of criticism as the plastic pollution crisis has worsened. In 
response, many have attempted to reduce the amount of plastic they use in a number of 
different ways, some more successfully than others. Greenpeace UK published its league 
table ranking UK supermarkets from best to worst according to their plastic footprint for 
2019. Among the best performers were Waitrose and Morrisons, scoring fifty-two and fifty-
one percent respectively, while no other brands got over fifty percent, and the worst 
performing were Asda with thirty-nine percent and Aldi with thirty-eight [Lewis, 2019]. 
These scores were allocated according to five categories: ‘promises made on reduction and 
reuse’, ‘future plans on reduction and reuse’, ‘recycleability and recycled content’, 
‘influencing suppliers’ and ‘transparency’. While none of the supermarkets are doing 
enough to combat plastic pollution to be considered exemplars for the wider business 
world, the ones that are doing better could be seen as an example to the supermarkets that 
are doing worse. 
 One thing that it is important to remember when considering whether supermarkets 
are environmentally virtuous is the role that they play in the economy. As discussed in a 
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previous chapter, it is not the amount of plastic an exemplar uses that is worthy of 
emulation, but the process by which they assess and respond to their needs in the most 
efficient and sustainable way. Supermarkets have a different role to most businesses in the 
private sector in the sense that most of the goods that they sell are essential. To compare 
this to a previously discussed exemplar, very few of the products that The Body Shop sells 
could be considered essential because we could live without them quite easily. 
Supermarkets, on the other hand, are the main source of food products in our economy, 
with the so-called ‘big four’ (Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and Morrisons) having a combined 
share of almost seventy percent of the UK grocery market as of 2018 [Supermarket market 
shares, 2020]. Supermarkets sell essential goods, and often use plastic packaging as a way of 
reducing the price of these goods. This means that any assessment of their plastic use must 
take into account the effects that changing their packaging will have on these essential 
goods and the consumers that need to buy them. Moving towards environmental 
sustainability can incur costs which, in order to protect the companies’ profits, would be 
passed on to the consumer. That being said, this does not mean that they should not be 
trying to reduce plastic waste wherever they can, as they still have a responsibility to use 
what plastic they need as responsibly as they possibly can. The process by which they decide 
how much plastic to use, the core principles that form their ethos and how they interact 
with environmental issues are what need to be evaluated. Not just how much plastic they 
use, as these are the elements that define the relative environmental virtue of their 
character.  
 One much publicised way in which supermarkets are attempting to reduce their 
plastic use is by changing how they use plastic bags. Since the UK government introduced a 
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mandatory five pence charge on all single-use plastic bags sold by large retailers in England, 
a ninety percent reduction in consumer use has been reported [Department for 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2020]. This could be said to be a positive step, as in the 
short term it disincentivises us to use single-use plastic bags, and in the long term it 
confronts the way that we, as consumers, think about the plastic we use. However, as Lewis 
reports, ‘it’s just shifted the problem’ [Lewis 2019]. Supermarkets sold over one and a half 
billion new reusable bags in 2018, which equates to fifty-four per household. As these bags 
are designed to last longer and be used more than single-use bags, their manufacture is 
more environmentally damaging and they take a lot longer to biodegrade. The positive 
impact of the ninety percent decrease in sales of single-use plastic bags is offset by the 
negative impact of the twenty-six percent increase in the sales of reusable bags [Laville, 
2019b]. Gary Mortimer explains this phenomenon by observing that ‘shoppers slowly return 
to old habits, governments and retailers stop educating consumers and reusable bags soon 
make their way into waterways and landfill’ [Mortimer, 2017]. It is clear from this that UK 
supermarkets are far from exemplary in their use of plastic bags, and the fact that the real 
action on this issue came more from government than from supermarkets themselves 
shows that they do not have a disposition that drives them to reduce plastic pollution 
wherever possible. Despite the fact that Waitrose and Morrisons scored highest in the 
category of ‘progress made on reduction and reuse’ in Greenpeace’s league table suggesting 
that they are doing better than others, no UK supermarkets seem to be appropriate 
exemplars of environmental virtue when it comes to plastic bags.  
 Another way in which UK supermarkets have attempted to reduce plastic waste is by 
reducing the amount of plastic packaging that goes on their products. Waitrose may be the 
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best example of this, with its 2019 test of a package-free shopping experience in its Oxford 
Botley Road shop [Fearnley-Wittingstall, 2019]. This scheme, which Waitrose calls 
‘Unpacked’, allows customers to fill their own containers and use reusable and returnable 
containers that the shop provides to package all of their products. After receiving a positive 
response from customers, the company has extended the scheme to three more locations 
around the country [Waitrose and Partners, 2020]. This scheme is one way in which 
Waitrose hopes to achieve its ultimate aim to ‘eliminate unnecessary plastic and make all 
own-brand packaging reusable or made out of widely recyclable or home-compostable 
material by 2023’ [Ibid.]. This goal is admirable because it addresses the issue of plastic 
pollution in a timeframe that is much more appropriate than that to which many others, 
including the British government [BBC News, 2018], have committed. The fact that they are 
already testing out such radical ideas as the Unpacked scheme reinforces that they are 
committed to achieving this goal, which is a further reason why they are admirable. Iceland 
is another example of a UK supermarket that has set a goal of being plastic-free by 2023, 
and have already reduced the plastic packaging on a number of their products. It is also 
admirable because they provide regular updates on their progress towards this target on 
their website [Plastics Pledge Progress – About Iceland, 2020]. This is admirable because it 
allows Iceland’s customers to hold the company to its word and can put pressure on them if 
they feel it is not trying hard enough. In pursuit of this goal, Iceland claims to have so far 
saved 850 tonnes of plastic [Plastic-free by 2023 – About Iceland, 2020], which is a good 
start, but the company needs to go much further if it wants to cause real change. While 
both Waitrose’s and Iceland’s goals are admirable and they seem to be making some 
progress towards them, there is not enough evidence to conclude that they have virtuous 
characters, but they could provide some guidance to other supermarkets in terms of 
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progressing towards virtue. The projects that these companies are undertaking are 
admirable, and are the kind of thing that fit what we would imagine an environmentally 
virtuous supermarket would do. Neither Waitrose nor Iceland has yet proven themselves 
enough for us to say that, when a supermarket is wondering what the most environmentally 
virtuous action is, they should ask “What would Waitrose or Iceland do?”. However, it may 
be enough to provide some guidance of how they can improve in some ways. For this 
reason, we do not have enough evidence to say that, when it comes to plastic packaging, 
any UK supermarket is a perfect exemplar of environmental virtue ethics, but Waitrose and 
Iceland certainly come close and could be seen as exemplars of progress towards virtue.   
 Overall, it can be concluded that Waitrose is the best exemplar of progress towards 
environmental virtue among UK supermarkets, although it has not yet done enough for us 
to say that they have achieved environmental virtue. In the case of many other 
supermarkets the intention to do something about plastic pollution is evident, but what 
action it has led to has not caused a meaningful positive impact outside of being admirable 
for its good intentions. While Waitrose is by far the most promising candidate for the status 
of environmental exemplar, due to its high score in Greenpeace’s league table and its 
commitment to plastic-free packaging, it has not yet shown that it has formed a virtuous 
disposition towards the environment, and therefore its status should carry a caveat.  
 
7.3 The Coca-Cola Company 
Another example of a business that has cultivated an environmentally friendly image is The 
Coca-Cola Company, manufacturer of the soft drink Coca-Cola, among other products. Its 
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recently established ‘World Without Waste’ campaign sets out what it calls its fundamental 
goals in the fight against plastic packaging waste. However, Coca-Cola was the worst plastic 
polluter in the world in both 2018 and 2019 [Petter, 2019], the first two years of the 
campaign, and in October 2019 the company’s global chief executive stated that they have 
no plans to reduce their use of plastic bottles [Simon, 2019]. As one of the most 
recognisable brands in the world, and one that is trying to advertise itself as 
environmentally conscious, it is important that we look at why Coca-Cola is not an 
appropriate environmental exemplar. It will be argued that, while some aspects of the 
company’s stated environmental goals are admirable, it fails to follow up on its commitment 
to action on plastic pollution and sets a bad example for other businesses. 
 Coca-Cola launched its environmental campaign ‘World Without Waste’ in 2018 with 
a stated purpose to ‘make the world’s packaging waste problem a thing of the past’ [The 
Coca-Cola Company, 2019]. In order to achieve this, they set out three fundamental goals, 
the first of which was aimed at reducing the environmental impact of their products’ 
packaging, with a goal to ‘make 100% of our packaging recyclable globally by 2025 – and use 
at least 50% recycled material in our packaging by 2030’. The second was an attempt to 
offset the negative impact of the products that they plan to sell in the future, with the goal 
to ‘collect and recycle a bottle or can for each one we sell by 2030’. The third was a 
commitment to join other organisations in carrying out environmental programmes with the 
goal to ‘work together to support a healthy, debris-free environment’ [The Coca-Cola 
Company, 2019, p.4]. These goals are admirable in some ways and disappointing in others. 
The first goal is admirable because it represents an attempt to create a closed loop 
system of production so that no new plastic products are going into landfill and damaging 
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the environment. However, the goal of using fifty percent recycled material in their 
packaging means that they still need to produce virgin plastic for up to fifty percent of every 
new bottle they make. While claiming to want to help the environment, Coca-Cola still 
intends to produce an astronomical amount of plastic well into the future. Far from creating 
a closed loop, if a hundred percent of the materials in the packaging is recyclable and they 
are only using fifty percent recycled material in new packaging, then fifty percent of the 
recyclable material in every bottle is going to waste, increasing the amount of plastic 
pollution in the environment. In a time when all businesses should be committing to 
producing less plastic, Coca-Cola has committed to producing more and framed it as an 
environmentally virtuous action, when in fact it is the opposite.  
 The second goal is admirable because it is an acknowledgement of Coca-Cola’s 
responsibility for contributing to the plastic pollution crisis. By collecting and recycling a 
bottle or can for every one it sells it will be hoping to cancel out the negative environmental 
impact of the physical packaging waste of their future products. However, the physical 
packaging is not the only environmentally harmful plastic waste that is caused by the 
production of their plastic bottles and cans, and the recycling process is not completely 
efficient, so even if they achieve this goal they will not be completely offsetting the damage 
they are doing by continuing to produce plastic bottles. Additionally, this goal does nothing 
to remedy the crisis that we are already in because it is entirely based on cancelling out the 
bad effects of future products. There are already too many unrecycled plastic bottles in the 
environment. In the UK alone we incinerate around three billion per year and put a further 
two and a half billion in landfill [House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2019, 
p.8], and the latest figures estimate that 234 million plastic bottles are littered in the UK 
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every year [p.9]. The goal that Coca-Cola have set themselves makes no commitment to 
reduce the number of plastic bottles that are already out there, which would help to solve 
the problem, only to try and stop the problem getting worse. The issue is that the amount of 
plastic in the environment right now is unsustainable and needs to be reduced urgently, not 
just kept the same as it will be in 2030, when it is estimated that there will be 300 million 
tonnes of plastic in the world’s oceans [WWF & Dalberg Advisors, 2019, p.9]. The Coca-Cola 
Company’s second fundamental goal is not admirable as it does not go far enough to solve 
the crisis of plastic pollution, and conservative efforts like this will only make the crisis 
worse.  
 The third goal is admirable because it acknowledges the need for global cooperation 
on the crisis, with Coca-Cola aiming ‘to build a global network of competitors, consumers, 
elected leaders, environmentalists, regulators, retailors and stakeholders of every kind’ [The 
Coca-Cola Company, 2019, p.30]. This network is directed towards investment in ‘the 
circular economy’ where the waste materials from products re-enter the manufacturing 
process so that there is as little waste as possible. This, again, is admirable insofar as it 
means the company is committing to not making the crisis worse. However, as with the 
previous goal, any progress towards achieving it has no impact on the waste that is already 
out there in the environment, waste that Coca-Cola is largely responsible for. Despite this, 
the company should get at least some credit for recognising the need for cooperation and 
that its role as a leader in the beverage industry means it is well placed to engage others to 
achieve this goal. 
 One problem that affects all of Coco-Cola’s fundamental goals is the timeframe that 
the company sets for achieving them. Aiming to offset the environmental impact of 
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packaging waste by the year 2030 is unambitious for a number of reasons, the most 
important of which is that, even taking into account waste-reduction initiatives like Coca-
Cola’s, ‘the plastic system is expected to double the amount of plastic pollution on the 
planet’ and ‘carbon dioxide emissions from plastic waste management could triple by the 
year 2030’ [WWF & Dalberg Advisors, p.9]. Every year that passes that we have not reduced 
the amount of plastic pollution in the environment, the task becomes harder and so setting 
a target for a decade in the future is not good enough. This also prevents Coca-Cola from 
developing a disposition to act environmentally virtuously, because it is consistently 
avoiding its responsibility for the plastic pollution crisis and refusing to act in an effective 
way to solve the problem.  
 As with previously discussed businesses, it is important to remember the role that 
Coca-Cola has and to proportion its need to use plastic accordingly. The main product that 
the company produces is the eponymous soft drink, but it also produces a number of other 
products, and its subsidiaries include British coffee house chain Costa Coffee [BBC News, 
2018]. The nature of the company’s products means that it has a huge need for plastic 
packaging, and the extent to which it is an exemplar is not based on how much plastic it 
uses, but on how it decides what its needs are and how it responds to the crisis. Concluding 
that Coca-Cola is not an appropriate exemplar of environmental virtue purely based on the 
fact that it uses a lot of plastic would be to misunderstand how we are supposed to emulate 
exemplars according to environmental virtue ethics. As previously highlighted, by emulating 
the exemplars’ processes of deciding how to interact with the environment, not just the 
interactions themselves, moral agents are more likely to develop an environmentally 
virtuous character.  
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That being said, Coca-Cola have shown that their process for deciding how much 
plastic it needs to use does not fully take into account the pressing need to reduce overall 
plastic use and only use as much as is absolutely necessary. The company’s global chief 
executive has admitted that they have no plans to reduce its use of plastic bottles [Simon, 
2019], and the company has been accused of fighting efforts to reduce the amount of plastic 
waste it creates [Lerner, 2019]. The company has cited customer demand as the reason for 
sticking to plastic packaging, despite surveys showing that two thirds of people in Britain 
think that companies should be required to use eco-friendly packaging even if this means 
prices rising [Waldersee, 2019]. This shows that the company is not serious about 
addressing plastic pollution, nor is it basing its use of plastic on its needs. The process by 
which it decides how to interact with the environment is not environmentally virtuous, and 
therefore should not be emulated. 
 Overall, it can be concluded that The Coca-Cola Company is not an appropriate 
exemplar for environmental virtue ethics. While it cultivates an image of an environmentally 
conscious business with its World Without Waste campaign, the goals that it sets for itself 
are not bold enough and will not result in enough real change. This is due to the fact that 
they do not address the damage that has already been done and that their targets are too 
far in the future to be effective or to result in the development of a virtuous disposition. In 
terms of its efforts to achieve its stated goals, Coca-Cola has not acted in good faith, nor has 
it taken actions that one would expect from an environmentally virtuous company. It could 
even be said that they are responsible for creating more environmental damage because, by 
giving everyone the impression that they are doing something about the environment, they 
reduce the pressure that they are under to act responsibly. For these reasons, it can be 
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concluded that The Coca-Cola Company is not an appropriate exemplar for environmental 
virtue ethics.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
We have seen that there are already many examples of businesses that are attempting to 
address the crisis of plastic pollution, but of the ones that have been discussed in this 
chapter, only The Body Shop can be said to be environmentally virtuous. When looking for 
appropriate exemplars of how businesses can develop environmentally virtuous characters, 
the aim is to find one about which businesses can ask “what would x do?” where x is the 
exemplar business. As previously stated, this does not necessarily mean how much plastic 
they use, although this is taken into consideration relative to their needs, but the processes 
and dispositions that influence how they interact with the environment in general.  
 If a business were to assess its use of plastic and, in trying to act environmentally 
virtuously, asked themselves “what would Coca-Cola do?”, then this would not result in 
virtuous action. In this case the company would keep using plastic at an increasingly 
unsustainable rate, not make any effort to actively reduce the amount of plastic in the 
environment, and at the same time claim to be environmentally friendly by engaging in 
projects meant to do the bare minimum in response to the crisis. For this reason it cannot 
be said that The Coca-Cola company is an appropriate exemplar for environmental virtue 
ethics, and businesses should not look to emulate them if they want to develop an 
environmentally virtuous character.  
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 If someone running a supermarket were to ask themselves how they should be 
responding to the crisis of plastic pollution, they might ask themselves “what would 
Waitrose do?”. In this case the supermarket would most likely commit to going plastic-free 
by 2023, a good target with a short enough timeframe to be effective in comparison to both 
Coca-Cola’s and the British Government’s. Although it provides more effective guidance 
than Coca-Cola, we cannot be sure that the dispositions that result from emulating 
Waitrose’s way of approaching plastic would be environmentally virtuous. Therefore, it can 
only be concluded that Waitrose is an appropriate exemplar for progress towards 
environmental virtue, and not that it is itself environmentally virtuous. 
 If a business were to ask itself “what would The Body Shop do?”, then the result 
would be that they would integrate environmental projects into its fundamental principles 
to ensure that those projects are not one-off or dismissed because they do not have short 
terms returns. It would also commit to making its products environmentally sustainable and 
track its progress towards this goal using the biodegradability scoring system, which would 
improve the accountability of businesses as a whole. Additionally, it would look for 
opportunities, like the partnership with Plastics For Change, to actively reduce the 
unsustainable amount of plastic in the environment rather than simply promising to keep it 
the same or even increase it. For these reasons, a business that emulates The Body Shop is 
most likely to develop a virtuous disposition out of the businesses discussed in this chapter. 
This means that The Body Shop can be considered an appropriate exemplar for how 
businesses can be environmentally virtuous. 
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Chapter 8: Do we have environmental exemplars within the UK political system? 
So far we have identified a few exemplars of environmental virtue that we can emulate if 
we want to improve our relationship with plastic. However, in order to see how far society 
has to change in order to achieve real progress, it would be useful to examine the examples 
being set in our current political system. The political system in the UK extends further than 
the people that currently form the government. It includes representatives from different 
parties across the political spectrum, the various branches of the civil service that interpret 
and implement the government’s policies, the non-governmental organisations that lobby 
the government on certain issues, and the local authorities that implement policies on a 
local level. This chapter will examine the roles that some of these branches of the UK 
political system play in responding to the crisis of plastic pollution and the climate 
emergency, and whether any of them can give us guidance on how we can develop an 
environmentally virtuous character. 
 
8.1 The Government’s Plastic Policies 
In the UK, the Conservative Party has been in government since 2010, at which point an 
estimated 1.2 million tonnes of plastic waste were reported per year according to official 
figures, and by 2016 that figure had risen to 1.53 million tonnes [Smith, 2020, p.5]. 
However, these statistics have been questioned by some organisations such as the WWF, 
who reported that the total plastic waste generation in the UK in 2014 was 4.9 million 
tonnes [WWF, 2018, p.2]. It is clear that there is a problem with plastic pollution that the 
government needs to deal with, and it is only getting worse. Much of the UK’s current 
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legislation that deals with plastic waste is derived from legislation from the European Union 
(EU), which generally sets adequate baselines in terms of environmental action. However, 
the UK has not taken the opportunity to build on these baselines with more progressive 
policies that address the scale of the problem, nor has it been particularly successful so far 
in implementing the policies that it has inherited from the European Union. For these 
reasons, the UK government is not an appropriate exemplar for environmental virtue ethics.  
 The current aim of the UK government is to move towards a circular economy, 
where the waste products of plastic production are fed back into the production process in 
order to cause as little pollution as possible. To this end, it is implementing the waste 
management hierarchy required by the European Union Waste Framework Directive, which 
provides a process for deciding how to deal with plastic products [Smith, 2020, pp.13-14]. At 
the top of the hierarchy is preventing the need to waste plastic by using less material, 
keeping the product for longer and using less hazardous materials. After this is ‘preparing 
for reuse’, which means making an effort to reuse the product by cleaning, repairing or 
replacing parts of it. If this is not possible then as much of the product should be recycled as 
possible, and any parts that cannot be should then be processed to recover any energy from 
them that is possible. Only when all of these options have been exhausted should plastic 
waste go into landfill [Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 2011, p.3]. The 
intention behind applying this hierarchy is that less plastic ends up at each successive stage, 
and therefore less ends up entering the environment in harmful forms. This is a good 
framework, but on its own is not enough to be an effective response. For the government to 
be an appropriate environmental exemplar it has to consistently and effectively apply this 
hierarchy, as well as taking similar measures to all forms of waste and promoting targets for 
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reducing our reliance on plastic, and collecting and recycling the plastic that is already 
polluting the environment.  
 In an attempt to make packaging producers take more responsibility for the end 
recycling of their products the EU gives the UK a target in the form of the EU Packaging 
Directive. This means that UK businesses are tasked with recycling at least seventy percent 
of the packaging waste they produce by weight by the year 2030 [Smith, 2020, pp14-15]. 
This target is positive as a minimum requirement to fight the build up of plastic waste in the 
environment, but it does not go far enough, fast enough to effectively address the problem 
or to be seen as an example for others. The main problem with this directive, however, is 
not in the directive itself, but in the way that it has been implemented in the UK. The 
government is responsible for implementing this directive, which it does by placing a legal 
obligation on businesses over a certain size that make or use plastic packaging, to ensure 
that a proportion of the packaging they place on the market is recovered and recycled. The 
obligated businesses collect evidence of waste packaging recycling and recovery equivalent 
to the weight of their obligations from accredited exporters. The problem with this system, 
as highlighted by a National Audit Office report, was that there were no checks to ensure 
that exported material was actually recycled. It also observed that ‘the government has no 
evidence that the system has encouraged companies to minimise packaging or made it easy 
to recycle’ [National Audit Office, 2018]. This means that the government has failed in both 
of the aims of the EU’s directive, as it has failed the most important task of reducing the 
amount of packaging that is produced, and the second most important task of making sure 
that what packaging does get produced and used either gets reused or recycled. In failing to 
implement even the most basic measures to address the plastic pollution crisis, the UK 
government shows that it is not an appropriate environmental exemplar.  
Page | 92  
 
 The Environmental Audit Committee also investigated the scheme and found that 
taxpayers were covering around ninety percent of the costs of packaging waste disposal 
rather than the obligated businesses, concluding from this that ‘the producer responsibility 
scheme is not working as it should’ [House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 
2017, para.47]. The committee also called for the Environment Agency to be given greater 
regulatory control and for waste processors to be held accountable to the Environment 
Agency for how they spend packaging revenue [para. 48]. This again highlights the 
government’s failure to implement measures designed to reduce the future damage to the 
environment caused by plastic, and supports the conclusion that it is not an appropriate 
exemplar for environmental virtue ethics.  
 The government has acknowledged the problems with its policy as highlighted by 
these reports [HM Government, 2018, pp.34-35] and set out its response in a number of 
publications, culminating in the Environment Bill 2019-20. This bill contains provisions 
designed to increase corporate responsibility and improve enforcement of the scheme in 
line with the criticism the previous policy received [Smith, 2020, p.19]. While this element of 
the Environment Bill is positive, it has also drawn a lot of criticism for not going far enough 
[Harrabin, 2019]. The policies that the bill proposes will go further towards addressing the 
crisis than the government is currently going, but they are a long way from being good 
enough to solve it. Greenpeace UK have pointed out that, in response to the proposed 
charges on more kinds of single-use plastics, companies are likely to switch to using other 
materials in their products that are just as, if not more environmentally harmful than plastic. 
They also argue that by ‘bringing the UK in line with the EU’s single-use plastics directive’, 
the government is doing the bare minimum when it comes to reducing plastic pollution 
[Chetan-Welsh, 2019]. It can therefore be said that the Environment Bill 2019-20 does not 
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provide adequate guidance on how to respond to the plastic pollution crisis, as it is not 
setting a high enough standard of moral virtue, on the contrary, the government is not living 
up to the standards that those it means to govern expect of it.  
 In conclusion, the UK Government is not dealing with the plastic pollution crisis in an 
effective way. By going no further than the obligations it has to enact EU directives, the 
government has consistently shown that it does not have a disposition to reduce the causes 
of plastic pollution wherever possible, and therefore that it cannot be said to have an 
environmentally virtuous character. Despite acknowledging where it has failed to properly 
implement policies intended to reduce plastic pollution, its continued unwillingness to enact 
legislation that will cause real change means it does not embody what one would expect 
from an environmentally virtuous government. It can therefore be concluded that the UK 
government is not an effective exemplar for environmental virtue ethics.  
 
8.2 Political Pressure Groups  
As it seems the government cannot be relied upon to set the right example on plastic 
pollution, it falls to the British public to hold them to account and pressure them to do more 
to solve the problem. One way in which this is currently done is through environmental 
campaign groups like Friends of the Earth and Surfers against Sewage, which attempt to 
influence government policy making, legislation and public opinion by applying pressure to 
elected officials on behalf of their members. As representatives for public interest on 
specialist issues, with a combined membership in the hundreds of thousands, these 
campaign groups form a key part of the political system in the UK. These organisations set a 
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good example of how to put pressure on the government to do more on environmental 
issues, as well as how to empower local communities to take action into their own hands 
and fight pollution on a local scale. The example that these groups set, combined with their 
foundational commitments to environmental principles, mean that they should be 
considered appropriate exemplars of environmental virtue within the context of our current 
political system.  
 Friends of the Earth was founded in the United States of America in 1969 and has 
been active in the UK since 1971, when its first campaign promoted reuse of 
environmentally harmful materials by dumping thousands of glass bottles outside the 
London headquarters of Cadbury Schweppes [Friends of the Earth, 2020a]. Since then it has 
successfully lobbied the UK government on a number of issues such as fossil fuels, including 
persuading the Welsh Assembly Pension Scheme to divest from fossil fuel companies 
[Friends of the Earth, 2020b]; aviation, including helping to prevent a third runway at 
London Heathrow Airport [Friends of the Earth, 2020c]; and plastic pollution, including 
making the town of Caerphilly in South Wales a ‘plastic free community’ [Bello, 2019]. The 
success of these campaigns shows that the organisation is effective in achieving real 
progress on environmental issues, an admirable attribute which contributes to its 
environmentally virtuous character.  
 Friends of the Earth have also criticised the government’s Environment Bill 2019-20 
for failing to make ‘legally binding commitments to immediate and long-term action to 
achieve near-zero plastic pollution’. It has also criticised the government’s general approach 
for focusing too much on recycling which cannot ‘keep up with the growth of plastic 
production’ and ‘energy-from-waste’ solutions, instead calling for a focus on ‘reduction of 
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the use of plastic’ [Kirby, 2020]. Campaigning for these kinds of policies is admirable 
because it accepts that more drastic measures are necessary and puts pressure on those in 
power to implement these measures. Within a political system where business interests are 
often prioritised above the people’s, Friends of the Earth sets a good example of how we 
can fight back and make our voices heard. This makes Friends of the Earth an appropriate 
environmental exemplar, as by emulating its actions and motivations, we can develop a 
virtuous disposition to not automatically accept environmental legislation as sufficient and 
instead analyse it and demand that it goes further when it needs to.  
 Another environmental campaign group that sets a good example of environmental 
virtue is Surfers Against Sewage, a British charity that advocates for marine conservation 
and protection. While the name reflects the original purpose for which they were originally 
founded, the charity also leads campaigns on a number of environmental issues including 
plastic pollution [About us, Surfers Against Sewage, 2020]. In its Plastic Free Communities 
campaign, Surfers Against Sewage hopes to achieve two main aims: the first is to reduce the 
amount of plastic that ends up in the environment, and the second is to take plastic out of 
the environment by cleaning beaches [Plastic Pollution, Surfers Against Sewage, 2020]. This 
approach is admirable because it tries to empower communities to take responsibility for 
solving the problem as best they can, and to a lesser extent because of the pressure that it 
puts on the government. One problem with the first aim, however, is that it does not go far 
enough to address the cause of plastic pollution in the first place, which Friends of the Earth 
highlighted as the most important priority. It could also be argued that its advocacy for a 
deposit return scheme, where consumers pay a deposit for the plastic products they buy 
and then receive it back when the product is recycled or returned, unfairly punishes the 
average consumer. It is estimated that households contribute just eight percent of the 
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plastic waste produced in the UK every year [Smith, 2020, p.5], so there needs to be more 
pressure on politicians to target the waste generated by other producers, such as the 
service sector, which contributed fifty three percent. While its goals may not necessarily go 
far enough on a national political scale, the effectiveness of its grassroots campaigning and 
the processes by which it decides the most effective ways to combat plastic pollution make 
Surfers Against Sewage an appropriate exemplar of how to organise communities to take 
action against plastic pollution.  
 In an ideal political system that was based on environmental virtue, there would be 
no need for these environmental pressure groups to exist in their current form, as the 
power would already be in the hands of the communities that they represent, and 
environmental policy would be decided through a system of direct democracy of the kinds 
discussed in Chapter 5. However, in absence of large-scale political change, we should aim 
to emulate these environmental campaign groups so that we can exercise the power that 
we have in the current system to make as much change as possible. Friends of the Earth and 
Surfers Against Sewage are appropriate exemplars for environmental virtue ethics, 
especially when considering how communities can take action to help reduce the amount of 
plastic pollution in their local environments. Additionally, Friends of the Earth have shown 
throughout their history to be effective campaigners for environmental justice and to have 
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Chapter 9: What would an environmentally virtuous person look like? 
In the preceding chapters we have seen that there are a number of admirable individuals, 
communities and organisations who instantiate various forms of environmental virtue. 
While we have seen that these exemplars can be emulated, they cannot simply be copied by 
those that want to cultivate a virtuous character, as their circumstances will never be 
exactly the same. Also, because agents are less likely to develop a virtuous character by 
copying the actions of the exemplars, we have seen that they should instead be emulating 
their attitudes towards the environment. Throughout this research it has been clear that the 
role of exemplars in environmental virtue ethics is to provide guidance on how to approach 
environmental issues, rather than to give concrete rules on how to treat the environment. 
With this in mind, it would be contradictory to give an account of what an environmentally 
virtuous person who emulated these exemplars must be like. Instead, this chapter will 
identify the traits that exemplars have in common, and discuss what guidance they can 
provide with regards to how we should approach the crisis of plastic pollution. 
 From the Rojava exemplar we can emulate the values described in the work of the 
two philosophers that inspired it, Murray Bookchin and Abdullah Öcalan. These 
philosophers value the empowerment of average person in society above all else, as all the 
other virtuous aspects of Rojava’s political system stem from it. Even if the political 
structures in this country remain as they are, the values that define Rojava can still be 
emulated by cultivating a social disposition to organise within communities and advocate 
for common interests. Perhaps the most important criticism of our society that libertarian 
municipalism makes is that governments should be more accountable to the people, and by 
taking this criticism to heart and acting on it, we can develop a disposition to respond to the 
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plastic pollution crisis in appropriate and effective ways. In a way this is the goal of the 
environmental campaign groups that we have looked at in UK politics, in that they are based 
around a commitment to organising as a community and holding the government to 
account. While an environmentally virtuous society may have less of a need for groups like 
Friends of the Earth and Surfers Against Sewage, this is because emulating the values that 
motivate them would contribute to making society more environmentally virtuous. 
 We have seen that in Rojava, the political decisions do not always have the most 
environmentally friendly consequences, and this is one of the reasons why we cannot say 
that by emulating them exactly we will be more environmentally virtuous. This is perhaps 
the clearest example of why we cannot do this, because the circumstances under which 
they make their decisions, a continuing war against ISIS, are so radically unique. We should 
instead take guidance from the values that underpin the decision-making process in Rojava:  
a community-based approach where everyone has equal representation and rights, which 
grows from a demand to hold the government to account. This approach results in 
environmental protections because it empowers the most vulnerable people in society, who 
are the most likely to be affected by the consequences of climate change and otherwise 
would be the least likely to be heard. and there is a fundamental consideration of the need 
to protect the environment. Applying these values to our own decision-making processes is 
more likely to result in the cultivation of a virtuous political process than the one we have 
now.  
 From Native American communities we can emulate the idea of a ‘land ethic’, where 
the main aim of any process of farming or cultivating land is the maximisation of the 
sustainable yield. In this way we can ensure that we do not damage the environment by 
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seeking the maximum short-term productivity that we can extract from it. In order to instil 
this view in future generations, it needs to be combined with a holistic view of the 
environment, where every member of the ecosystem is given equal importance. From this 
grows an understanding of the need to maintain biodiversity and view humans as stewards 
rather than masters of the land.  
 This is reinforced by the example seen in aboriginal attitudes to the environment, 
which have developed and changed throughout history, but have maintained at their core a 
holistic view of the environment. Emulating this viewpoint means that we can develop a 
virtuous character that motivates us to approach the various environmental problems we 
face in appropriate ways. This concept, as Kohen observed, grew out of ‘their spiritual and 
religious beliefs’ [Kohen, 2003, p.ix], which presents an obstacle to those who do not share 
these beliefs. However, there are secular ways in which non-aboriginal people can adopt 
these values, as Graham described, through education that promotes consideration for 
other members of the community and a close relationship with the environment [Graham, 
2008]. Through these processes, we can develop virtuous characters that will motivate us to 
improve the way that we interact with the environment and properly address the problem 
of plastic pollution. As evidenced by the aboriginal exemplar, this does not mean that there 
is one morally good way to treat the environment, but that, as long as interactions with it 
are derived from or motivated by a virtuous character that is inspired by these values, those 
interactions will be virtuous.  
 Taking inspiration from the example that The Body Shop sets, we can emulate the 
idea that environmental sustainability should be at the core of every business’s ethos. By 
comparing The Body Shop to the other, less appropriate candidates we have discussed, we 
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can see that it succeeds because everything that it does comes from a fundamental 
motivation to protect the environment as much as possible while still making a profit. In this 
way it is similar to the motivation that underpins the Native American land ethic, just 
adapted for the business world, in the sense that the goal is not to make as much profit as 
possible, but to grow the business as much as is environmentally sustainable. Taking 
inspiration from The Body Shop, other businesses could become environmentally virtuous 
by incorporating sustainability into their core values so that it informs business decisions in 
a similar way.  
 Another admirable characteristic of The Body Shop is the way that it scores its 
products based on how biodegradable they are, and then consistently tries to improve 
those scores. Other businesses could emulate this by bringing in similar methods of 
evaluating the environmental footprint of their products, which would allow customers to 
make decisions about which products they buy based on their habits of buying more 
environmentally sustainable products. In its turn, this would motivate businesses to 
compete to have the most sustainable products in order to attract as many customers as 
possible. Through this process the companies would develop a disposition to try to make 
their products more sustainable at every opportunity, and in doing so they would cultivate 
an environmentally virtuous character.  
 Businesses looking to become more environmentally virtuous could also emulate 
The Body Shop’s attitude towards its supply chains, which it examines to track the 
environmental impact of its products at every stage of their lifecycle in order to reduce their 
environmental footprint. The results of this are exemplified by their partnership with 
Plastics for Change, but other businesses applying the same process will likely find other 
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ways of reducing their own environmental footprint in ways that are appropriate to their 
circumstances. What is important is that, by emulating The Body Shop, businesses can 
cultivate a disposition that motivates them to look for opportunities to improve their 
sustainability and reduce plastic pollution wherever they can.  
 In conclusion, it is clear that there is no one correct way to apply the exemplar 
approach to environmental virtue ethics, because there is no one correct way to emulate 
any of the exemplars we have identified. However, by looking at the values that inform how 
these exemplars interact with the environment, we have seen that their examples can be 
used as guidelines for cultivating our own environmentally virtuous character. Through 
adopting a view of politics that values equal rights for all, we can habituate ourselves to 
always consider people’s right to a clean and healthy environment, and the responsibility 
that our representatives have to reflect these rights through their actions. Through adopting 
a holistic understanding of the environment, we can cultivate a disposition that drives us to 
always act in the most environmentally sustainable way. Through making sustainability one 
of the core values of our economy, we can create a business environment that is habitually 
disposed to take responsibility for its environmental footprint and always consider the 
sustainability of its practices. By following the guidelines set out by the environmental 
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Conclusion 
At the onset of this research the scale of the crisis of plastic pollution was clearly presented, 
as was the need for us to radically change how we as a society engage with the 
environment. The main aim of this thesis was to determine how we can employ 
environmental virtue ethics to improve our relationship with plastic. The method by which I 
have attempted to achieve this aim was through the exemplarist approach to virtue ethics, 
which involved identifying exemplars of environmental virtue. The hope is that, by 
emulating these exemplars and asking the key question of “what would they do in my 
situation?” we can develop virtuous dispositions towards the environment in general and 
plastic in particular.  
 The difficulties in using the exemplarist approach to environmental virtue ethics 
were in finding the criteria for identifying appropriate exemplars. This was solved by 
adopting a wide interpretation of Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory that incorporated a 
knowledge of the Aristotelian virtues and the concept of the golden mean. According to this 
interpretation we can identify exemplars by searching for admirable individuals, 
communities and organisations who instantiate some form of environmental virtue that 
agents can practically emulate. 
I feel that this thesis has contributed to the subject of environmental virtue ethics by 
showing that there are exemplars of environmental virtue ethics that can give us effective 
guidance on how to deal with the plastic pollution.  
The first of these exemplars is Rojava, which is virtuous in its fundamental ideals of equality 
and environmental rights, which form an important part of its character that leads its 
people to act in an environmentally moral way. However, there is future research required 
Page | 103  
 
on this topic to determine whether, in a time of peace the society commits further to 
environmental causes and abandons fossil fuels as its main source of income. On the other 
hand, were the conditions in Rojava to worsen, and make survival in the region more 
difficult, it could be interesting to see whether the society stick to its fundamental principle 
of environmentalism or whether it is sacrificed for survival. The conclusions of this future 
research could have interesting implications for environmental virtue ethics.  
The second group of exemplars identified by this research were indigenous populations, 
namely Native Americans and Australian Aboriginals, who are exemplary based of their 
holistic views of the environment and the importance of sustainability that grows from this. 
We have seen how this character can be cultivated even in cultures that do not share the 
same spiritual or religious beliefs. Further research into this topic could be conducted as 
more evidence is discovered about the history of indigenous populations. This discussion 
would also benefit hugely from the participation of indigenous scholars, as the insight they 
could provide into the values these communities hold would be invaluable. 
The third exemplar of environmental virtue is The Body Shop, which can provide guidance to 
businesses on how they can cultivate an environmentally virtuous ethos through 
incorporating sustainability goals and setting long-term targets for reducing their plastic 
footprint. This chapter also identified some other companies that did not quite do enough 
to be called appropriate exemplars, but future research that looks at whether companies 
like Waitrose and Iceland stick to their goals and incorporate them into their ethos could 
conclude that they are appropriate. Perhaps future research could also look at how an 
industry-wide scoring system could be implemented to compare the biodegradability and 
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plastic footprint of different companies’ products to allow customers to make more 
informed decisions about the products that they buy.  
Finally, this research identified environmental campaign groups play an important role in 
holding the government to account and organising communities to take control of the 
political process. They also organise through local groups to affect real change to the 
environment on a local level by organising events that target reducing plastic pollution. In  
Chapter 8 I discussed the ways in which the UK government fails to be an appropriate 
environmental exemplar by not properly implementing the responsibilities it is given by the 
European Union’s environmental authorities, and failing to build on the baseline 
environmental legislation to protect the environment and reduce plastic pollution. Further 
research could be conducted to see whether the government sets any of these targets, in 
which case its appropriateness as an environmental exemplar could be re-evaluated. More 
research could also be conducted into the governments of other countries that have more 
progressive environmental policies, and whether they can act as an exemplar for the UK 
government to follow.  
In the crisis of plastic pollution, we do have environmentally virtuous exemplars to give us 
guidance. It is how we choose to emulate these exemplars that will reveal our own 
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